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SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE ADJUDICATIONS AT
HHS: TWO APPROACHES TO
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN
AN EVER-EXPANDING
BUREAUCRACY
Phyllis E. Bernard, J.D., M.A t
I. INTRODUCTION
IN GREEK LEGEND, the Hydra was a nine-or-so-headed mon-
ster vanquished by Hercules in his famous Twelve Labors. The
Hydra presented an awe-inspiring challenge to Hercules: as soon as
Hercules cut off one of its heads, two more grew in its place. Fur-
ther, the center head was immortal.
For someone like myself, an attorney whose work has often in-
volved labors with the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the story of Hercules' battle with the Hydra reso-
nates. Litigating against HHS can quickly bring to mind images of
the Twelve Labors. HHS - not the Department of Defense - is
the largest federal agency, even after creation of the Department of
Education. At an annual budget of approximately $600 billion, if
HHS stood alone as a nation, it would be the fourth largest in the
world, following the U.S., Japan, and Germany. In terms of specific
programs, most of HHS' formidable resources are allocated to So-
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cial Security retirement and disability, plus Medicare; programs
which, despite heralded cut-backs, continue to grow.
What is the immortal center head? In this droll, impressionistic
analogy, the Hydra-as-HHS has not one but two center heads which
appear immortal. One cries and strives for individual justice. The
other fights back, concerned that the needs of the many might have
to outweigh the needs of the few, or the one.
In the Greek myth, Hercules ultimately bested the Hydra by
poisoning the roots and decapitating the center. Hopefully, in the
American reality, the Hydra-as-HHS need only be tamed, not de-
stroyed, and the immortal center can reach accommodation with
itself. This article takes a small step in the direction of seeking
accommodation.
SEEKING ACCOMMODATION NOW TO PREPARE FOR
FUTURE GROWTH
Administrative agency adjudications probably present the clear-
est arena for examining the seemingly immortal, contrary pulls be-
tween individual and mass justice. In HHS those dynamics play out
most vividly in two different models of adjudication: the SSA
model, using hundreds of employees as administrative law judges
(ALJs); and the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB)
model under the Medicare program, using a small panel of in-
dependent political appointees as adjudicators, usually sitting en
banc. The SSA model (especially for disability cases) generates a
high volume of decisions where the initial amount in controversy
ranges from small to moderate. It accomplishes this through a pro-
cess that, in terms of construing evidence, somewhat resembles a
judicial assembly-line. The PRRB model, on the other hand, pro-
duces a vastly smaller volume of cases involving high initial
amounts in controversy. The judicial process there resembles hand-
crafted piecework.
In and of themselves conducting a comparison of these two
models might well intrigue any scholar of administrative law. How-
ever, they deserve examination as more than a mere academic exer-
cise because, just when it seemed HHS could grow no further, HHS
is due to expand yet again. After the year 2000, just a few years
away, America's post-war baby-boomers will begin making their
first claims for coverage by the Social Security safety net. Honoring
those claims over the ensuing decades will present an unprece-
dented fiscal and administrative challenge. Further, the increased
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demands of claimants on the Social Security entitlement programs
will, in turn, create increased demands on the federal court system
- if the processes for administrative resolution and judicial review
remain as they currently are.
One government organization recently attempted to grapple
with a segment of this future challenge now. The Federal Courts
Study Committee (the Committee) was established by the 100th
Congress .. .to "examine problems and issues" currently con-
fronting the nation's courts, and to "develop a long-range plan for
the future of the federal judiciary."' This was an historic task, the
first such undertaking since the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. Its
statutory mandate required the Committee to assess whether and
1. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 102, 102 Stat. 4644 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (West
Supp. 1992)). The Federal Courts Study Committee consisted of 15 members appointed by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist according to Congress' statutory instruction, viz., that
they be "representative of the various interests, needs and concerns which may be affected by
the jurisdiction of the Federal courts." Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 103(b) (1988). In keeping
with that objective, the Committee included two members from each house of Congress, two
federal district court judges, three federal courts of appeals judges, one state supreme court
chief judge, two private practitioners, two federal prosecutors and one state public advocate.
By December 1988, one month after the Committee's creation, they began work.
Under the chairmanship of the Honorable Joseph P. Weis, Jr. of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, the Committee solicited the views of all members of the federal
judiciary by use of a survey. Clearly, information concerning workload for federal judges was
critical. Therefore, the Committee sent questionnaires on this issue to all Article III judges.
The response rate was extremely high - 90%. They also contacted all federal court adminis-
trators and law school deans. Next, the Committee invited suggestions from already consti-
tuted groups which fairly represented the diversity of viewpoints Congress sought: citizen
groups, bar organizations, research groups, academics, and civil rights interests. In order to
provide a broad forum for discussion, the Committee also held four public hearings in At-
lanta, Boston, Chicago and Pasadena. A total of 78 witnesses testified in the series of hear-
ings held in the winter of 1989-90. Finally, the Committee sought commentary and studies
from organizations which observe the federal court system as some part of their on-going
mission or on contract: the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Federal
Judicial Center, the Carnegie Foundation, and the Center for Public Service Resources. Jo-
seph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Courts Study Committee Begins Its Work, 21 ST. MARY'S LJ.
15, 16-17 (1989).
The Committee cast a wide net to gather expeditiously the most significant problems and
issues to bring before Congress, the Supreme Court, and the President by April 1990. In
terms of administrative law, those highly ranked problems and issues seemed to revolve pri-
marily around Social Security disability claims. This subject largely eclipsed concerns about
agency and appellate review of the multitude of other federal programs. The exceptions are
few: the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, recommending "a five-year pilot pro-
gram whereby the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, with the consent of both
parties, would offer binding arbitration of claims of employment discrimination," and the
National Labor Relations Board, recommending that "Congress should amend 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 to provide that National Labor Relations Board orders be sel-enforcing and to give
jurisdiction over contempts and executions to the district courts." REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
CCOURTS STUDY CoMMrrEE [hereinafter REPORT] at 19, 60-62, 96, 100-101 (April 2, 1990).
To the extent that the Report treats administrative review generally, that consideration is
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how the structure of the federal court system should be changed to
improve access and efficiency. Numerous committees, commis-
sions, and task forces had previously examined segments of this co-
nundrum. This Committee was the first to cast a broad view,
attempting to identify key problems of the entire federal court sys-
tem in one ambitious report.
In terms of government entitlement programs, the Committee
focused its main inquiry on the Social Security disability program
and its ALs, which are so numerous as to form the largest single
body of AL~s in the entire federal administrative judiciary. The
Committee determined that, as a first step, the system needed to be
reformed to limit severely the availability of judicial review by an
Article III court. The Committee proposed that review of the So-
cial Security administrative judiciary be had by a newly established
Article I Social Security Court. Consequently, only issues of pure
law could be heard by the Article III federal courts.
The Committee believed that this proposal would significantly
aid in decreasing expected future congestion in federal courts.
However, the Committee seemed to leave open for further research
and discussion the question of whether this new model for adjudica-
tion would satisfactorily respond to increased future congestion at
the agency level. Furthermore, this model would severely limit Ar-
ticle III court review - which many perceive as the only review
which constitutionally guarantees institutional impartiality and in-
dependence of judgment. This would place much greater burdens
on agency adjudicators to demonstrate somehow that individual
fairness could be achieved in an almost assembly-line process.
Clearly, the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee
(Report) did not expect to reveal and to resolve the system's
limited to a recommendation not to establish a specialized Article III administrative court.
Id at 72-73, 116-24.
This article, in essence, takes up where the Committee left off. The Committee performed
the formidable work of surveying the nation to determine what problems deserved highest
priority for the long-range health of our federal system ofjustice. In so doing, the Committee
developed some 100 suggestions for changes. Congress moved quickly to adopt legislation
addressing the many non-controversial proposals of the Committee. Indeed, the Report was
published April 2, 1990; by fall, 1990. Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
"Implementation of Federal Courts Study Committee Recommendations," was law. For a
fuller presentation of the legislation and its changes, see 136 CONG. REc. 150, Pt. II S17577-
17583 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (comments of Sen. Grassley, Floor Manager and former mem-
ber of the Federal Courts Study Committee, plus section-by-section analysis of Title III); 136
CONG. REc. 150 Pt. III S17904-17915 (BIDEN, MOORHEAD); 136 CONG. REc. 150 Pt. II
H13315-13316 (REP. MOORHEAD) (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Rep. Moorhead, former
member of the Federal Courts Study Committee).
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problems in one document. In fact, the authors of the Report ad-
monish that their efforts do not represent the end, but rather mark
the beginning of a longer, more probing study of the issues raised
therein. The Report counseled that "Congress, the courts, bar as-
sociations and scholars should give the problem of appellate proce-
dure serious attention over the next five years." In particular, the
Committee urged us to engage now in analyzing "the strengths and
weaknesses of more far-reaching changes." Such foresighted analy-
sis should help moderate disruption to the legal system "if and
when such changes become necessary. 
'2
Taking that charge to heart, this article adopts the recommen-
dation by the Committee to establish a Social Security Court and
marks the trajectory of that proposed "far-reaching change." This
article attempts to describe where such change might lead if it were
applied in time to more adjudications under the Social Security Act
(SSAct).3 The article focuses specifically on how such a proposal
might affect the procedures for review of disputes between large,
institutional providers of services under Medicare4 and the govern-
ment, since these payments form the largest single category of dis-
bursements under the Medicare program, roughly $50 billion
annually.5 Procedures for Medicare review in the last three years
have received little in-depth attention by scholars despite some in-
teresting developments in the area.6
2. REPORT, supra note 1, at 116.
3. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et
seq. (1990) (original version Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935)).
4. Health Insurance for the Aged and Disabled, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (1990) (added July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291).
5. To quote from the findings of the Division of National Cost Estimates, Office of the
Actuary, Health Care Financing Administration:
Medicare program benefits amounted to $76 billion in 1986, 7.8 percent more than
in 1985. Because of the nature of the program, two-thirds of benefit payments were
for hospital services; almost all of the remainder were for physician services. Na-
tionwide, Medicare is the largest single purchaser of hospital care and physician
services, accounting for 29 percent of all hospital revenue and for 21 percent of
physician services.
8 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 13 (Summer 1987).
6. An informal review of the literature shows that although writers have begun to ex-
amine the system of administrative and judicial review for institutional claims under the
Medicare program, this examination generally has stopped short of the most recent changes
in this system. See, eg., Richard J. Wolf, Note, Judicial Review of Retroactive Rulemaking:
Has Georgetown Neglected the Plastic Remedies?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 157 (1990); Douglas E.
Cressler, Note, Medicare Provider Reimbursement Disputes: Mapping the Contorted Borders
of Administrative and Judicial Review, 21 IND. L. REv. 705 (1988); Kathleen A. Carrigan,
Comment, Administrative Law - Jurisdictional Authority of the Provider Reimbursement Re-
view Board, 10 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 183 (1988). Prof. Kinney's comprehensive overview
of the Medicare appeals system also largely pre-dates the changes discussed within this arti-
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THE POSSIBLE FUTURE OF ADJUDICATIONS FOR
FEDERALLY SPONSORED HEALTH SERVICES
While the precise future of Medicare is unclear, one can rest
assured that some form of federally sponsored health services will
be an important part of our nation's future. Indeed, as of this writ-
ing, both major political parties and innumerable non-partisan orga-
nizations have proposed and lobbied hard for various plans to
achieve comprehensive national health reform. For many of these
proposals, Medicare, either in its current form or somehow re-
vamped, plays a central role.
Although the overall form may not be certain, one thing is:
whatever the plan for federal sponsorship of health services, there
will be disputes over payment; and because these plans are supposed
to offer universal coverage, the volume of disputes over health pay-
ments will increase logarithmically, compared to today's numbers.
Another factor is certain: the tenor of the long-standing, some-
times contentious debate between the provider community and
HHS concerning administrative adjudication under Medicare will
increase in intensity. For example, the hospitals, nursing homes
and home health agencies which have been subject to HHS' process
for resolving Medicare payment disputes will no longer have a mar-
gin, a cushion to rely upon in case of a protracted adjudicatory pro-
cess or in case of a contrary decision. Virtually from the inception
of Medicare, there has been a tacit, winking understanding that
when institutional providers are unable to recover their full, bona
fide costs for providing care under the Medicare program, those in-
stitutional providers will shift the costs to private payers - despite
statutory provisions to the contrary. Under a comprehensive sys-
tem for health services, such cost-shifting will no longer be possible.
Clearly, this would be most especially true if one of the cur-
rently leading proposals were adopted. That option would simply
expand Medicare to provide universal coverage.7 If this does occur,
we shall need to examine with great care the procedural mecha-
cle, specifically the resolution of PRRB jurisdiction to hear claims under the Prospective
Payment System (PPS), where the Secretary attempted by regulation to foreclose administra-
tive and judicial review. See Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage
and Payment Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 105
(1987); also J. Timothy Phillips & Don E. Wineberg, Medicare Prospective Payment: A Quiet
Revolution, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 13 (1984); Michael Neeley-Kvarme, Administrative and Judi-
cial Review ofMedicare Issues: A Guide Through the Maze, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1 (1981).
7. See, e.g., Karen Davis, Expanding Medicare and Employer Plans to Achieve Univer-
sal Health Insurance, 265 JAMA 2525 (1991). Also Donald Nutter et al., Restructuring
Health Care in the United States; A Proposal for the 1990s, id. at 2516. The proposal to
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nisms for resolving citizen-government disputes over health insur-
ance payments. Will the adjudicatory model favor that of the SSA
or the PRRB? Will it be a blend of the two? Will it add wholly new
components? We need to develop a legal process that allows access
to administrative and judicial review while not overly burdening the
court system. Of course, in this best-of-all-worlds scenario, we
probably need to fashion an administrative review system which
manages to assure fairness with a minimum of court review. And
limited court review is precisely what the Federal Courts Study
Committee recommended for at least one program under the Social
Security Act.
OVERVIEW OF THIS ARTICLE
We can also fully expect that if and when this increase in sub-
stantive coverage occurs, we shall see a several-fold increase in the
number of persons and institutions questioning whether the proce-
dural protections provided under the program are sufficient. If the
Committee's recommendation is accepted, then the ultimate ques-
tion may be whether limiting access to the Article III courts is just.
Perhaps the ultimate answer will be that the propriety of limiting
access to Article III court review depends upon the reliability, fair-
ness and efficiency of the administrative review process below.
This article attempts to get a "head start" on that debate, fash-
ioning a legal discussion before the debate is overtaken as a political
issue. We begin with the Committee's recommendation as it was
presented, and then extrapolate questions raised by that recommen-
dation to the Medicare appeals system as it currently exists.
Thus, Part II outlines the Federal Courts Study Committee's
recommendation that Congress create an Article I Court to replace
federal district courts in the appeal of disability claims under the
SSAct. Actually, the recommendation to establish a specialized
court is not new, and has progenitors reaching back to the establish-
ment of the Administrative Procedure Act itself.
Part III takes an historical look back to identify themes relevant
to the current and future system for review of Medicare disputes.
Certain thematic concerns shaping discussion of the Federal Courts
Study Committee's recommendation have existed from the very be-
ginning of the Social Security Act and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act. This section traces how, decade after decade, Congress
expand Medicare coverage for all citizens has the strong support of major unions, such as the
United Auto Workers, and major employers, such as Chrysler Corporation.
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has expanded substantive coverage under various titles of the SSAct
while procedural mechanisms for handling the increased volume of
agency cases lagged far behind. Eventually, the increased pressure
on the administrative system caused a shift in the tone of the
discussion.
The debate over administrative and judicial review from the
1930s through the 1960s struggled with how to expand access and
improve efficiency in processing appeals. In the 1970s and '80s,
budget restraints loomed increasingly important - not only in
terms of substantive coverage under SSAct programs, but also re-
garding procedure in SSAct appeals. The term "efficiency" in the
administrative review process took on a connotation other than
"timely, prompt." At least from the perspective of the executive
branch, an "efficient" system for adjudication became one which
reasonably assured that decisions by ALJs conformed to agency
methodologies for reaching budget targets. This change caused
some to refocus their attention when analyzing the review system.
Of critical concern in structuring a system of administrative jus-
tice is whether those acting in a quasi-judicial capacity are insulated
from improper pressures that seek to control program costs at the
expense of individual justice. Thus, this section concentrates on the
themes which enable us to identify the areas in the system that pos-
sibly create undue pressure on adjudicators. This discussion closes
with the establishment of the Provider Reimbursement Review
Board, an independent tribunal within HHS designed with the ob-
jective of insulating the decision-makers from such pressures.
Part IV turns from the lessons of the past to the challenges of
the present. Concerns which plagued the system for administrative
review of disputes under Title II of the SSAct, the disability pro-
gram, are tested in the context of Title XVIII, the Medicare pro-
gram. This section examines more closely the Secretary's non-
acquiescence with regard to the most critical procedural matter
which has yet faced Medicare Part A: the availability of adminis-
trative and judicial review under the Prospective Payment System
(PPS). I also explore certain policies of managerial and budget con-
trol which, inadvertently, perhaps threaten the independence of the
Board staff, if not the Board members.
Finally, in Part V, I make preliminary recommendations for fur-
ther study. This article is only the first of a three-part, mid-range
study of this subject. Further study includes questioning how creat-
ing a Social Security Court with expanded jurisdiction to cover na-
tional health insurance disputes might comport with developments
[Vol. 3:339
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in administrative law in other Western countries. In its Report the
Federal Courts Study Committee alluded to how European juris-
prudence has long recognized a need for specialized courts, espe-
cially for administrative matters. Here I suggest looking more
closely at that reference and question its applicability to American
administrative law, our health care financing system, and American
perceptions of justice.
Next in Part V, I suggest some options which the Federal
Courts Study Committee did not examine in its Report. Whether
we look at Medicare provider adjudications for the purpose of more
efficiently clearing the current 6,000 case backlog; or, whether we
look at those adjudications to create a model which can more effi-
ciently handle a greatly increased volume of health payment dis-
putes in the not-so-distant future - a different adjudicatory model
than either that of the PRRB or the SSA may be needed. That
model might create a new layer of ALJs, whose decisions are re-
viewed by the PRRB. Further judicial review (either to an Article I
or Article III court) might be severely limited. That model might,
in addition, include alternative dispute resolution to handle smaller
claims (less than $50,000) and an ombudsman system to avoid the
confusion that leads to payment disputes in the first place.8
II. MAPPING THE CONTOURS OF THE FUTURE
CHALLENGE
A. Challenges Facing the Next Generation of SSAct Appeals
The Federal Courts Study Committee attempted to direct the
legal community's attention to the fact that here, in the first half of
the 1990s, we face a singular opportunity to make fundamental ad-
justments to our system of judicial review over the next generation
or more. Surely, some of the most profound questions of real and
perceived justice in the modern administrative state are: Who shall
have access to Article III federal court review of administrative ad-
judications? If there were no such review, or if the review were
limited, has justice been done? On the other hand, if Article III
courts are overburdened by reviewing tens of thousands of highly
8. I am grateful to say that in August, 1992 the Council of the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States placed these inquiries on the ACUS research agenda. Also in Sep-
tember, 1992 the National Advisory Committee on Rural Health adopted as part of its
principles of health care reform that "A reform program must include efficient, alternative
systems for the resolution of payment issues and conflicts."
1993]
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technical adjudications annually, does the loss of efficiency itself
work an injustice?
Regarding this issue, the Committee chose to focus most closely
on judicial review of one class of administrative adjudications under
the SSAct - disability claims. The wisdom of this starting point
readily manifests. The Social Security disability program9 presents
a massive, easily identified - yet not readily resolved - problem in
administrative justice. Access to court review confronts the need
for efficiency in resolving disputes in a clash that is vivid, tangible.'0
I venture to predict that before the decade has drawn to a close,
we shall see a convergence of public interest in this question of ac-
cess and efficiency. Whether we look to the popular press, the com-
munity of scholars, the Congress, or the executive branch, I believe
that we shall see sustained, national concern over administrative
justice in adjudications.
This concern will focus on much more than only disability
claims. The entire range of programs under the Social Security Act
will experience heightened strain as increased numbers of claimants
wrestle with the government for benefits which are seen as "budget
busters": retirement benefits, survivors' benefits, Aid to Families
with Dependent Children, Medicaid, Medicare. Since the executive
and legislative branches appear unwilling to confront program cuts
in the open arena of the budget process, the financial exigencies of
these massive benefit programs will probably be played out in the
closed arena of agency adjudications. If the government continues
on the course which it began in the 1980s, then, on a case-by-case
basis benefits will be questioned and reduced, payment policies will
be tightened, all in an effort to satisfy budget needs.11  In the
9. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 423,
(1990) (amending ch. 531, Title H § 223, as added Aug. 1, 1956).
10. The leading work on the clash between access and efficiency in the disability pro-
gram is Jerry L. Mashaw, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISA-
BILITY CLAIMs (1983). See also, Jack B. Weinstein, Equality and the Law and Social Security
Disability Cases in the Federal Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897 (1984) (giving a human face
to the steps involved in this conflict).
11. For example, as the result of a hard-fought legislative, regulatory and court battle
from 1982 through 1987, the Medicare program finally implemented an adjustment to hospi-
tal payments which provided a small amount of additional monies to hospitals that serve a
"disproportionate share of low-income" and Medicare patients, as set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww (d)(5XCXi) (1992). This payment adjustment has represented for many public
hospitals the critical margin which enables them to continue to serve the indigent populations
for whom these hospitals are the provider of last resort. See Redbud Hosp. Dist. v. Heckler
[1984-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 34,085, at 9882 (N.D.
Cal. July 30, 1984). The Secretary had been so reluctant to issue the regulations mandated by
Congress that Congress had finally implemented the provisions by statute. Id. Then, approx-
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meantime, the very process will, perforce, greatly increase the vol-
ume of appeals. And those claimants will likely expect to have ac-
cess to a federal court for review of actions taken by the
Department of Health and Human Services in order to feel that
justice has been done.
How can we examine the legal nuances of stretching the Social
Security Act appeals system - and judicial review of that system
- to fit the demands of the next generation? At first look, the very
idea of taking on the entire Act's appellate process seems indeed
like wrestling a hydra-headed phantom. At second look, one pro-
gram under the Act emerges as a particularly likely candidate for
closer, and fruitful, examination: the Medicare program.
By sheer dollar amount, Medicare ranks second only to the re-
tirement benefits program in importance. Moreover, its payment
policies drive the entire health care industry - the second largest
activity in the U.S. economy, representing 12% of the gross na-
tional product. (National health expenditures are expected to reach
$1.5 trillion by 2000, representing 15% of the GNP.)12 Typically,
hospital expenditures have outpaced growth in the GNP by about
4.5% annually.13 The pressures on the federal budget are consider-
able. If only because of demographic pressures, as the numbers of
Medicare-eligible persons increase, so shall the pressures on the
Medicare budget. Therefore, so shall the pressures on the appellate
process increase.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the Medicare program may
imately a year later, HCFA's Office of the Inspector General began to target Medicare bad
debts - typically incurred by hospitals serving large proportions of indigent patients - for
special audits, even after the amounts claimed had been approved by the fiscal intermediaries.
See, eg., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF AUDIT, HHS, BLUE CROSS AND
BLUE SHIELD OF COLORADO - REVIEW OF MEDICARE BAD DEBTS FOR THE PERIOD JULY
1, 1982 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1986 [includes Denver General Hospital, St. Anthony
Hospital System - seeking approximately $300,000 in additional recoveries from the hospi-
tals] (March 1, 1988); BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF TEXAs, INC. - REVIEW OF MEDI-
CARE BAD DEBTS FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 1, 1980 THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1986
[includes Harris County Hospital District, Santa Rosa Medical Center, University of Texas
Medical Branch at Galveston - seeking approximately $4 million in additional recoveries
from the hospitals] (November 22, 1988); BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA, INC.
- REVIEW OF MEDICARE BAD DEBTS FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 1981 THROUGH SEP-
TEMBER 30, 1986 [includes Jackson Memorial Hospital, Southeastern Medical Center, Flor-
ida Medical Center - seeking approximately $2.7 million in additional recoveries from the
hospitals] (October 28, 1988).
12. Helen C. Lazenby & Suzanne W. Letsch, National Health Expenditures, 1989, 12
HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. I (Winter 1990); Division of National Cost Estimates, Office of the
Actuary, Health Care Financing Administration, National Health Expenditures, 1986-2000, 8
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 1 (Summer 1987).
13. Division of National Cost Estimates, supra note 5, at 17.
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earn the dubious distinction of forming the centerpiece for debate
on the issue of universal health insurance. A consensus is develop-
ing that America must establish some sort of national health insur-
ance. The precise legislative vehicle remains wholly unclear. But
political will and vision may not coalesce to create an entirely new
program. Therefore, some pragmatists have renewed the suggestion
that we merely expand Medicare coverage to include all Americans,
not only the elderly and the disabled. This option has the benefit of
familiarity - and seemingly breeds less contempt as the more inno-
vative alternatives grow less feasible. 1
The Medicare program in 1986 covered approximately 31 mil-
lion persons. By 2000 it is estimated that our national population
will reach more than 275 million.15 Even assuming that all Ameri-
cans would not necessarily enroll in an expanded Medicare pro-
gram, the increase still would be staggering. And one must assume
that the difficulties in obtaining efficient review of Medicare disputes
will similarly increase many fold. Query: will this high volume of
appeals be adjudicated through the faster yet less sensitive SSA-AL
model or through the slower yet more discretionary PRRB model?
Regardless, without other changes, the often-feared "flood" of ap-
peals to the federal courts would no longer be apocryphal. Just ex-
trapolating the numbers results in a very real increase in an already
overwhelming federal caseload. Congress may then need to revisit
the recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee.
Congress may question whether an Article I court is needed in or-
der to bank the flood of appeals to Article III federal courts. Even
more so, Congress may need to question whether a new model for
14. This proposal actually is far from new, but it has progressed at a glacial pace. When
President Franklin D. Roosevelt transmitted to Congress the report of the Committee on
Economic Security, resulting in the Social Security Act of 1935, he affixed a formal message,
recommending the following types of legislation:
1. Unemployment compensation.
2. Old-age benefits, including compulsory and voluntary annuities.
3. Federal aid to dependent children through grants to States for the support of
existing mother's pension systems and for services for the protection and care of
homeless, neglected, dependent, and crippled children.
4. Additional Federal aid to State and local public health agencies and the
strengthening of the Federal Public Health Service. I am not at this time rec-
ommending the adoption of so-called "health insurance," although groups repre-
senting the medical profession are cooperating with the Federal Government in
the further study of the subject and definite progress is being made (emphasis
added).
H.R. Doc. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), as reprinted in STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: INCOME SECURITY 96 (Robert B. Stevens ed., 1970).
15. Division of National Cost Estimates, supra note 5, at 13, 19.
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administrative adjudication must be developed, one which blends
the best of both, or adds new components entirely.
B. Efficiency vs. Fairness
This article, then, proceeds on the assumption that Congress
will continue - on a somewhat slower track - to examine the
more controversial proposals set forth within the Report. Of partic-
ular concern here is the Committee's recommendation that Con-
gress establish a specialized court for Social Security disability
claims. This Comment further assumes that, since the Committee
placed a high priority on making the Social Security program more
efficient, Congress may in time see a need to consider rationalizing
appeals taken under the entire Social Security Act.
A point which the Committee does not underscore in its Report
carries much weight here: The Social Security Act is a massive
piece of legislation. It governs not only disability claims, but retire-
ment insurance, survivors' insurance, and Medicare, plus Aid to
Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid. Its provisions
probably have a direct impact on more citizens of this nation than
any other statute, except for the Internal Revenue Code.16 Further-
more, similar to the I.R.C., its terms are complex and highly techni-
16. I.R.C. - § 1-7605 (West 1992).
This article covers the programs under Titles II, XVI, and XVIII of the Social Security
Act. The SSA-AIJ model applies not only to Social Security disputes, but also to beneficiary
or supplier claims under Medicare Part B (Medical Insurance) and smaller provider claims
under Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance). The appellate procedures, comparatively, are
displayed in the summary table below:
Titles II and XVI Title XVIII
Retirement &
Disability
Initial
Determination by
SSA Staff
Reconsideration by
SSA Staff
Hearing before SSA
AL
Final unless acted
upon by SSA
Appeals Council
Appeal to Article
III Federal Courts
Medicare Beneficiary
or Supplier (Part B)
Initial determination
by Carrier (private
entity operating
under contract as
fiscal agent for
HCFA)
Carrier Hearing
Hearing before SSA
AJ
Final unless acted
upon by SSA
Appeals Council
Appeal to Article
III Federal Courts
Medicare Provider
$100-$9,999 (Part
A)
Initial
Determination by
Intermediary
(private entity
operating under
contract as fiscal
agent for HCFA)
Intermediary
Hearing
Hearing before SSA
AIUJ
Final unless acted
upon by SSA
Appeals Council
Appeal to Article
III Federal Courts
Medicare Provider
> SlO,000 (Part A)
Initial
Determination by
Intermediary
N/A
Hearing before
PRRB
Final unless acted
upon by HCFA
Administrator
Appeal to Article
III Federal Courts
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cal, as explained through elaborate compilations of regulations and
manual provisions.
In other legal arenas, such complexity has formed the basis for
creating a separate, specialized court to review in appropriate detail
the arcane points involved. Practitioners in those specialty areas
have largely rated these courts successful - in fact, resoundingly
so. 17 Any attorney can readily empathize. It must be far more con-
venient and efficient (perhaps, though, also intimidating?) to try
cases before a judge with proven expertise in the minutiae of highly
technical arguments.
Nevertheless, such efficiency can come at a cost to the larger
system of jurisprudence. The judge's expertise in technical areas of
fact does not insure sound outcomes with regard to law, both sub-
stantive and procedural. Furthermore, undue specialization in any
court carries the potential for balkanizing the judiciary. A court's
narrow focus on law in one specialty area may ineluctably lead to
the development of a separate, artificial nation-within-a-nation,
which is not in line with trends in law as crafted by other courts
generally.
This is a delicate scale to construct. Even the component parts
defy easy identification. What factors need to be considered in de-
termining whether the process provides a proper opportunity for
persons to seek redress against their own government when they
believe they have suffered injury? This requires an examination of
the procedures offered. Most especially this requires a strong look
not only at the law, but at how well or poorly that law works when
applied in practice. On the other hand, surely we cannot create a
system of administrative adjudication that will permit each and
every claimant an extensive live hearing with multiple levels of re-
view. The system would grind to a virtual standstill if the proce-
dures allowed perfect, individual fairness.
Well then, we are forced to accept that in a system of mass ad-
ministrative justice a certain amount of gritty reality must creep in:
we must tolerate a certain level of unfairness. However, there must
17. See, eg, Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 745
(1981) (providing a helpful history and discussion of the debate concerning establishment of
courts where technical expertise is required).
Due to the increased number of cases where policy must be made concerning complex
scientific matters, some have even proposed establishing a federal Science Court. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey N. Martin, Note, Procedures for Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Uncer-
tainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 443 (1979) (proposing the estab-
lishment of a federal court due to the increased number of cases where policy must be made
concerning complex scientific matters).
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be a check on that unfairness. Who, then, decides whether the level
of imperfections has become intolerable in any given situation? The
courts. Indeed, maintaining access to the Article III courts has
been the safety valve which has assured a sense that justice was
achievable, even in a massive system that grudgingly accepts its
gritty imperfections.
The recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee
would seem to change the balance we have heretofore known. The
Committee's proposed model already exists at the Court of Veter-
ans Appeals. Now, that model would be extended to titles under
the Social Security Act. Access to Article III courts would be se-
verely limited, compared to the current procedural structure. In
their place would stand a specialized Article I court handling only
disability matters."8
18. The use of non-Article III bodies, which lack the constitutionally-protected indepen-
dence of judges under the federal court system, is controversial. It is also quite old. See
generally Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1990) (presenting the history and current status of specialized
Article I and Article III courts); Richard H. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts; Administrative
Agencie, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REv. 916 (1988) (providing a full discussion of the
constitutional dimensions of the controversy); George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce
Court" A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 238 (1964) (offering a deep
look at the two characteristics which doomed that particular court (which existed from 1910-
1913), and would surely doom any other specialized court).
[T]he creation of the court was essentially an attempt at administrative reform
which unintentionally interjected a new element into a context of struggle among
powerful groups. Bound by its functional nature to encounter the opposition of
some of these groups, the Commerce Court failed because it lacked two important
characteristics, either of which might have enabled it to survive the controversy:
I. The court failed to attract the active support of any of the influential inter-
ests involved.
2. It lacked the "judicial insulation" which in other cases restricts attacks
upon courts to criticism within 'the context of high public respect for the
judiciary.' [citation omitted]
Id. at 239.
The mechanics of personnel selection, and the environment in which thereafter they carry
out their duties would be critical in determining the acceptance of the Federal Court Study
Committee's recommendation. As Prof. Dix further explained with regard to the Commerce
Court:
In several important aspects, the new tribunal created in the public mind an
image more clearly resembling that of an administrative agency than of a legitimate
judicial body. A large part of the responsibility can be traced to the personnel of the
Commerce Court, who, for several reasons, tended to resemble policy-oriented ad-
ministrative officials rather than impartial judicial officers.
Id. at 255.
Rightly or wrongly, that impression began with the fact that Commerce Court judges
"were appointed by the Supreme Court Chief Justice from within the existing court system,"
which smacked of "promotion within an administrative hierarchy." Added to that, Com-
merce Court judges had only five-year terms of appointment, which contrasted sharply with
the "life tenure ofjudges on other federal benches." The position of Commerce Court judges
1993]
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Where did the Committee strike the balance between efficiency
and fairness? True to its statutory charge, the Committee appears
to have seen its task primarily as identifying methods of processing
the caseload of the federal court system in a more timely manner.
This is where the balance point appears set. Impliedly, the other
factors in this delicate scale will come into alignment around that.
And the Committee, in turn, charged scholars and others in the
legal community to examine in more detail whether and how those
other factors can align.
C. Reviewing the Committee's Recommendations
As described by the Federal Courts Study Committee, the cur-
rent appeals process for Social Security disability claims consists of
four stages.1 9 This process has suffered yet survived much criticism
over the past 20 years, reaching an apparent climax in the 1980s.
"seemed much like the limited terms of top administrative agency personnel. Contemporar-
ies were aware of the possible implications of the deviation from traditional methods of judi-
cial appointment." As the Commissioner of the Interstate Commerce Commission suggested,
if the Commerce Court were to be taken seriously, then judges should be appointed by the
president for life terms, as are Article III judges. "I think a court appointed in the usual way
would command the confidence of the country and of these conflicting interests in a way that
a court constituted in any other way would not." Id.
In reviewing the seemingly inconsistent variety of adjudicatory models, a recent study by
the Administrative Conference of the United States found:
Perhaps the most compelling comparison between two systems performing virtually
identical functions involves disability determinations by the Social Security Admin-
istration and the Veterans Administration. The SSA decides large numbers of disa-
bility cases informally-that is outside the formal adjudication requirements of the
APA-yet it uses ALJs to do so. The VA on the other hand decides its disability
cases informally and hears decisions before three-person panels of non-ALJ decid-
ers. Moreover the SSA decisions are subjected to close oversight by the district
courts, whereas the VA decisions are reviewed by an Article I Court of Veterans
Appeals with little federal court oversight.
Paul Verkuil et al., The Federal Administrative Judiciary (Draft) at 42 ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, May 1992.
19. The Federal Courts Study Committee's count can give rise to a small bit of confu-
sion. It counts the tiers of appeals as (1) a hearing before a Social Security AL, (2) a review
by the Appeals Council of the SSA, (3) review of the administrative record in the district
court, and then, (4) at the court of appeals, de novo review of the district court's decision.
However, this count does not include the initial step of review of the claim by the state
agency, which other writers on the subject include to create a five-step claims and appeals
process. E.g., ROBERT E. FRANCIS, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 1:04 (Callaghan & Co. 1991).
The SSA's own regulations count the appeals process as beginning not with the claim, nor
with the ALJ hearing, but with reconsideration of the initial determination. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.907 (1990):
Reconsideration is the first step in the administrative review process that we provide
if you are dissatisfied with the initial determination. If you are dissatisfied with our
reconsidered determination, you may request a hearing before an administrative law
judge.
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This negative attention centered particularly on whether the deci-
sion-makers enjoyed sufficient independence from political pres-
sures within the executive branch so that they could perform
genuinely disinterested reviews of claims against the agency. Critics
often pointed to the rate of reversal upon review by Article III
courts as an indication that the administrative reviewers harbored
an inherent, institutional bias in favor of the government and
against the private claimant.
As the process is drawn by the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee, one might seem encouraged to accept that, like most federal
programs, a claimant's appeal begins with the federal executive
agency. Actually, the disability program operates in the initial
phase as a federal-state joint venture. As expected, the federal So-
cial Security Administration (SSA) receives claims for disability
benefits, but then the federal district office transmits the claim to a
designated state agency to process according to federal regulations
and guidelines. It is the state agency, not the federal district office,
which develops the medical evidence and other relevant evidence to
prove or disprove a person's claim. The state determination is is-
sued as a federal decision.20 If a claimant is dissatisfied with the
initial determination of disability, the Social Security regulations
provide for a reconsideration of the initial determination.2 1 That
reconsideration follows the same slightly circuitous procedure: fed-
eral agency to state agency to federal agency.2 2
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 421(d) (1988); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907-909, 911, 913-922 (1990). As set
forth in § 404.916(c):
After you request reconsideration, your case file will be reviewed and prepared for
the hearing. This review will be conducted in the component of our office (includ-
ing a State agency) that made the initial or revised determination, by personnel who
were not involved in making the initial or revised determination. Any new evidence
you submit in connection with your request for reconsideration will be included in
this review. If necessary, further development of the evidence, including arrange-
ments for medical examinations, will be undertaken by this component. After the
case file is prepared for the hearing, it will be forwarded by this component to the
disability hearing officer for a hearing.
22. See Deborah A. Chassman & Howard Rolston, Social Security Disability Hearings:
A Case Study in Quality Assurance and Due Process, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 801, 805 (1980)
(offering some interesting insights into how the system worked in the 1970's, changes in the
1980's, and explaining one perspective on the difficulties in controlling the quality of the state
and federal review function). Some of the appellate procedures have changed since this arti-
cle was published; nevertheless it offers some interesting insights into how the system worked
in the 1970s, leading to changes in the 1980s. Chassman and Rolston had assisted in develop-
ing and operating a quality assurance system at the SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals
during the 1970s.
In the current literature, the Report for Recommendation 87-6 by the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS) for improving this level of disability review is, of
HEALTH MATRIX
The Committee did not propose to modify or eliminate this ini-
tial federal-state adjudication of claims. Instead the Committee re-
ally commenced its examination of the review process with the next
step, where the state agency no longer participates.
After the reconsideration, a claimant can obtain a formal SSA
hearing which may be oral or written.2 3 The great bulk of such
hearings are solely on paper. This hearing is conducted by an ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ) who is an employee of the Social Se-
curity Administration.
The Committee did not detail the ALJ's role in the hearing, and
so an additional comment is appropriate here. Historically, the
ALJ in an SSA appeal did not function solely as an arbiter between
the government and the citizen. The proceeding was ostensibly
non-adversarial. The AUJ therefore served as more than merely
judge. In the eyes of some, that dual role was as quasi-advocate for
the claimant. In the eyes of others, the dual role was, instead, as
quasi-prosecutor. In recent years, the trend has been to encourage
increasing formalization in the procedures used at this level, in or-
der to assure due process.24
The next stage consists of a review by the Appeals Council of
the SSA Office of Hearings and Appeals. 25 The Appeals Council
was established by regulation (not statute) in 1940. The jurisdiction
of the Appeals Council and the AiLJs extends beyond the disability
cases under Titles II and XVI (the Supplemental Security Income
or SSI program) of the Social Security Act, on which the Federal
Courts Study Committee focused. Rather, the Appeals Council
also reviews ALJ hearing decisions concerning beneficiary claims
and smaller institutional (provider) claims under the Medicare pro-
gram, which is Title XVIII of the Social Security Act.2 6
course, critical for understanding the nuances of this process in terms of administrative jus-
tice. See Allen E. Shoenberger, State Disability Services' Procedures for Determining and Re-
determining Social Security Claims for the Social Security Administration, I ACUS
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 579 (1987) (discussing the weaknesses and strengths of
the reconsideration process).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 421(d) (1988). The actual procedures are set out in the regulations at 20
C.F.R. § 404.929-404.961 (1992).
24. See, Frank S. Bloch, Report and Recommendations on the Social Security Adminis-
tration's Administrative Appeals Process, ACUS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 307, 369-
70 (1990) (emphasizing the independent status of the ALJ from the investigation or prosecu-
tion); and Recommendation 90-4, Social Security Disability Program Appeals Process: Supple-
mentary Recommendation, id. at 17 (summarizing prior recommendations in this area).
25. 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1991).
26. 42 C.F.R. § 422.205(a) (1992). This Comment will not focus on Medicare Part B
hearings, since the larger program issues (in terms, particularly of dollar amounts) are on the
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Review by the Appeals Council exhausts a claimant's adminis-
trative remedies - and often the claimant's pocketbook or stam-
ina.17 If the claimant still has the wherewithal to contest the
agency's determination, then she may proceed to federal district
court. There the court will review the administrative record to de-
cide whether substantial evidence supported the agency's action.
This stage does not provide de novo review. The decision-maker at
this level is an Article III judge with lifetime tenure.
The last step in the four-stage process takes the claimant to the
U.S. circuit courts of appeal. Here, the judge takes de novo review
of the decision rendered by the district court. Again, the judge en-
joys lifetime tenure, protected by his status under Article III of the
Constitution.
This, then, is the administrative appeals process which the Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee ranked as most in need of immediate
and substantial reform when compared to other federal agencies.
Verbatim, the Committee recommended the following:
Congress should create a new structure for adjudicating disabil-
ity claims under the Social Security Act: hearings before admin-
istrative law judges with adequate institutional independence,
whose decisions could be appealed to a new Article I Court of
Disability Claims, with review in the courts of appeal limited to
constitutional claims and to pure issues of law. 2
As envisioned by the Committee, this new three-stage process
would create a non-judicial branch forum with adequate and spe-
cialized resources to conduct business currently conducted in
overburdened federal courts. Since disability cases turn primarily
Part A side. The issue of Part B hearings by Social Security ALJs has received significant
attention in the past several years, and I would highly recommend to the reader: Eleanor D.
Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment Disputes Achieving Fair-
ness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L.J 1 (1987); ABA COMMISSION ON LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY AND ADMINiSTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
("ACUS"), MEDICARE PROCEDURES SYMPOSIUM - REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Leesburg, VA October, 1987); Judith G. Waxman & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr., Medicare Part B
Appeals -And You Thought the System Was Fixed, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 384 (Summer
1989).
27. The exhaustive report by Professors Koch and Koplow supporting ACUS Recom-
mendation 87-7 provides a valuable and balanced picture of the Appeals Council. See
Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple: A Study of the
Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals Council, ACUS REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 625 (1987) (providing a valuable and balanced picture of the Ap-
peals Council); Recommendation 87-7 A New Role for the Social Security Appeals Council, 1
ACUS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (recommending an upgrade in the salary level,
providing civil service protections, enhancing support systems, and enhancing the Council's
visibility).
28. REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
19931
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on complex medical facts requiring the decision-maker to possess
significant technical expertise, the Committee opined that an Arti-
cle I court could most efficiently handle the caseload. Because it
would be staffed with administrative judges skilled in disability law,
"these new Article I bodies will provide a more thorough and ex-
pert examination of the facts than federal district courts can pro-
vide, given the other demands on their time."29
The majority of the Committee believed it could place great con-
fidence in the ability of this Article I body to carry out its role not
only with competence, but with institutional integrity. The integ-
rity of the SSA ALJs as an institution has frequently been called
into question. As the Committee noted, "The Social Security Ad-
ministration has made controversial efforts to limit the number and
amount of claims granted by the administrative law judges, leading
to widespread fears that the judges' proper independence has been
compromised." 30 In order to protect the decision-making process
of this new Social Security Disability Court, the Committee would
cloak these ALJs with "sufficient institutional independence to
avoid the reality or appearance of" political control by the SSA.3
Therefore, the Committee encouraged Congress to create an in-
dependent agency within the executive branch which would employ
all federal ALJs, not only SSA ALJs.32
29. REPORT, supra note 1, at 56.
30. REPORT supra note 1, at 55. The controversies to which the Committee alluded
involved three key areas of concern:
(1) the use of medical-vocational guidelines, known as the "grid", to limit the discretion
of ALJs to determine whether jobs exist that a person having the claimant's qualifications
could perform - which in turn determined whether the claimant qualified for disability bene-
fits, Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983);
(2) the infamous "Trachtenberg memo" where the director of the Office of Hearings and
Appeals (Robert L. Trachtenberg) ordered, among other things, a review program intended
to influence ALJs into lowering reversal rates (i.e., finding more consistently in favor of the
Secretary), Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 680 (2d Cir. 1989); Association of Administrative
Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F.Supp. 1132 (D.C.D.C. 1984). See also Martin H. Redish and
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process,
95 YALE L.J. 455, 499-500 (1986); and
(3) the Secretary's long-standing policy of refusing to acquiesce in decisions by federal
courts which are contrary to the Secretary's chosen policies, see Steven P. Eichel, Respectful
Disagreement: Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies in United States Courts of
Appeals Precedents, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 463 (1985); Carolyn A. Kubitschek, So-
cial Security Administration Nonacquiescence: The Need for Legislative Curbs on Agency Dis-
cretion, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 399 (1989); Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw
Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REv. 471 (1986); Joshua
I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEo.
L.J. 1815 (1989).
31. REPORT, supra note 1, at 56.
32. Id. This proposal, like the more specific proposal of creating a Social Security
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Still working on the assumption that this configuration of exper-
tise and independence within the executive branch would prove effi-
cient, the majority of the Committee then proceeded to limit access
to federal court review. The majority saw itself as "concentrating
adjudicative resources" at the level where it could do the most
good. The system then, presumably, ought to be able to rely on
administrative adjudication to provide a correct and fair decision -
at least with regard to the facts. This had to be so; for further re-
view of factual issues would be precluded.
After the Social Security Court of Disability Claims rendered a
decision, the claimant would no longer have access to the federal
district court. The majority perceived this intermediate step as un-
necessary for it was then duplicated by the courts of appeals. As
reconstituted, the appeal would proceed directly to the circuit
court, where the court would take jurisdiction solely over questions
of law. Mixed questions of fact and law - such as whether there
was sufficient evidence under a particular interpretation of the law
to sustain the government's action - would not go forward. Like
Court, has a substantial history. A fuller examination of this particular issue lies beyond the
scope of this Comment, but several articles (including some sparked by the 1983 bill to create
an independent, government-wide AL corps) deserve a closer look by the reader interested
in this matter: Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at
the Federal Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266 (Nov. 1981); Victor W. Palmer, (an ALJ in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture), The Evolving Role of Administrative Law Judges, 19 NEw ENG.
L. REV. 755 (1984); Robert H. Joost, (a Judgment Officer, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission), A Corps of Federal Administrative Law Judges: Why? What Kind? Operating
How? Under Whose Control?, id. at 695; L. Harold Levinson, The Proposed Administrative
Law Judge Corps" An Incomplete But Important Reform Effort, id. at 733; Michael Levant,
(an AL with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission), Pointing the Way to ALI Inde-
pendence, 24 JUDGES' J. 37 (1985); Nahum Litt, (Chief ALl, U.S. Department of Labor) and
Joseph J. Simeone, (Senior Judge, Missouri Court of Appeals), An Administrative Law Judge
Corps: Its Value and Relation to the Traditional Justice System, 11 WHITrER L. REV. 569
(1989); and a fairly comprehensive note, Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation,
and Production Standard: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. Rav. 591 (1986).
The concern over AL independence remains high, for improper agency pressures exerted
may often be less easily identified than in other contexts. In 1991, legislation proposing an
independent AL corps was reintroduced. An insightful discussion of the problem appeared
in the ABA JOURNAL. Quoting Judge Litt (whose article is cited above), "Agencies exer-
cise control via different ways... anything as petty as parking spaces, adequate secretarial,
adequate law clerks, facilities, where judges are housed, how they're housed. A whole litany
of small things." Debra C. Moss, Judges Under Fir" ALl Independence at Issue, 77 A.B.A.
J. 56 (1991). The fundamental problem is that ALs are employees of the very agencies
whose cases they decide. As one outside observer noted, "Rather than having the indepen-
dence of a district court judge, they are essentially on the payroll and subjected to the pres-
sure of the agencies." Retaliation against outspoken, independent ALJs, allegedly, is not
unknown. Retaliation allegedly can take quite coercive forms, such as limiting salary in-
creases, or even eliminating the AL's job or removing him from a supervisory position.
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"straight" questions of fact, their review would end with the Article
I court.
A minority of the Committee, including the chairman, dissented
from this proposal. Instead, they recommended a structure which
would replace the current Appeals Council with a Social Security
Benefits Review Board constructed on the model of the board
model which reviews findings by ALJs in black lung and other disa-
bility cases, such as those decided under the Harbor and Longshore
Workers' Act.33 The minority believed it critical for the federal dis-
trict court to retain jurisdiction over the entire case. Full review
would assure that the court checked whether there was substantial
evidence to undergird the SSA's decision. After the district court
had completed its review, then, review by the court of appeals
would be limited to questions of "pure law.""
Thus, in the Committee's proposal we see replayed the funda-
mental questions essential for modeling a system of judicial review:
Should the "experts" determine the technically daunting facts of the
administrative case, subject only to limited court review? Should
that court review focus exclusively on questions of law? And, fi-
nally, should we strike a balance point between the two by establish-
ing an intermediate administrative court to act as "gatekeeper"?
The majority of the Committee proposed to install a gatekeeper Ar-
ticle I court.
Granted, this proposal suggests one way out of the anticipated
overload of federal court cases during the next 25 years. In that
sense, it seems superficially attractive. Looking more deeply, how-
ever, the proposal raises anew many lingering doubts held about
any moves to limit access to review by the one branch of govern-
ment which the Constitution established as a politically neutral ar-
biter: the Article III courts.
On its face, the distinction between review of fact issues versus
law issues has the appeal of tradition and simplicity. Yet, that ap-
peal quickly evaporates as one recalls that - traditionally - the
question of what is fact versus law verses mixed fact and law
presents one of the most difficult topics in administrative law. In-
stead of a simple, bright line, the proposal may well have drawn a
complex and wavering one.
Moreover, if the proposal shall bear any weight at all, then it
must stand or fall on the real and perceived institutional integrity of
33. 33 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. (1986).
34. REPORT, supra note 1, at 58-59.
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the hearing process both within the agency and in the proposed Ar-
ticle I court. This question goes to the heart of the proposal and its
viability. It gains overwhelming importance since the Committee
proposed to grant this Article I special court sole appellate jurisdic-
tion over mixed fact-law issues, including whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the agency's decision. This substantial
evidence test, arguably, is the most critical one in current adminis-
trative jurisprudence. If a constitutionally insulated Article III ju-
diciary shall no longer review this issue, can we rely upon the
administrative adjudicators preceding the Article I court to treat
this critical issue conscientiously?
Fortunately, we are not without resources in addressing this vi-
tal question. Indeed, as stated at the outset, the Federal Courts
Study Committee's Report represented a contemporary landmark
because of the comprehensive scope of its undertaking. However,
we, as civilized people, have been exploring this territory for some
time.35 Let us now turn to examine what we can learn from earlier
legal discussions in this particular area.
III. LEARNING FROM THE PAST
As we seek answers to our questions, it helps to "move forward
by checking in a rear-view mirror." The key concerns which shape
our discussion of HHS adjudications long pre-date the 1990 Federal
Courts Study Committee. In fact, they harken back to the birth of
35. Indeed, the underlying discussion traces its roots much farther than the modem
American administrative state. Some of our earliest recorded guidance dates from the Egyp-
tian origins of Western philosophy and law.
If you are a man who leads,
Listen calmly to the speech of one who pleads;
Don't stop him from purging his body
Of that which he planned to tell.
A man in distress wants to pour out his heart
More than that his case be won.
About him who stops a plea
One says: "Why does he reject it?"
Not all one pleads for can be granted,
But a good hearing soothes the heart.
The Instruction of Ptahhotep
(Egyptian, 6th Dynasty, 2300-2150 B.C.)
JERRY L. MAsIAw, DuE PROCESS IN THE ADMINmSrRATIVE STATE Vii (1985).
During the 15th through mid-17th centuries this fundamental principle had begun to flag,
resulting in the creation of infamous tribunals such as England's Star Chamber and Court of
Requests (1487-1641). This particular sense of a citizen's inherent right to dispute with his
government was revived in the 16th century and became enshrined in modern Western polit-
ical thought through the wings of Montesquieu, and, in tum, the Federalist Papers.
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both the Social Security Act (SSAct) and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).
The SSAct and APA were developed at roughly the same time
- with allowance for a brief hiatus during World War II. When
we turn to contemporaneous reflections on the two legislative un-
dertakings, some interesting gaps and parallels emerge. Those hits
and misses are instructive. For, as has often been remarked, one
cannot study administrative law without studying administrative
agencies. Here we learn through observing what the most signifi-
cant single body of administrative legislation, the APA, teaches us
about problems in judicial review of the most significant single ad-
ministrative agency, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS).
In the early days, through the 1940s, their development seemed
parallel and curiously unconnected. Few participants in the draft-
ing of the APA seemed to notice the emerging administrative giant
sitting at the table. Discussions about striking a balance between
relying on bureaucratic (politicized?) experts and relying on the in-
dependence of Article III courts typically did not mention the So-
cial Security Act or any of the programs which would come to be
administered by HHS. Neither did debates about the proposed ad-
ministrative court envision a future need for a special court solely
for Social Security, much less Social Security disability.
However, by the 1960s, the young giant had grown too hefty to
ignore. Concerns about administrative justice and the SSAct con-
verged in what has become known as the "due process revolution."
This revolution began with Title XIV of the SSAct (AFDC) and
came of age with interpretations concerning rights under Title II,
the disability program. Its impact rapidly spread throughout virtu-
ally every federal agency.
Will the Federal Courts Study Committee's proposal similarly
reshape the nature of judicial review? We shall see both later in the
theory of this article and later in the reality of the next decade.
A. The Growth of a Quiet Giant
This benign leviathan, the Social Security program, did not be-
gin as charity nor as a giant. As Roosevelt had signed the Social
Security Act of 1935 he envisioned, with the Congress, that
Pub.L.74-271 created a new version of an insurance plan - not
welfare. The payroll tax contributions under the Act were keyed to
contributions that the recipient had made during his or her working
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life. Thus, the program expected to be self-financing.36 Further-
more, this program was not to remake American social philosophy;
it merely presented a workmanlike solution to a discrete problem. 7
It is fair to say that in 1935 few people, if any, foresaw that the
Social Security Act would eventually expand to be the largest single
piece of programmatic legislation in the nation - measured in
terms of the federal budget outlay, staff, and recipients.38 Neverthe-
less, most did recognize that the federal government had turned an
36. For a more expanded discussion of the putative "self-financing" of Social Security,
see Skocpol & Ikenberry, The Political Formation of the American Welfare State in Historical
and Comparative Perspective, 6 CoMP. Soc. RES. 87 (1983). Skocpol and Ikenberry are only
two of many observers who note that the self-financing feature is illusory. Actually, the
amount which a worker pays into the fund is not directly proportional to the amount which
that worker receives. Therefore, the workers who contribute more subsidize the workers who
contribute less.
37. It seems curious that, even with 20/20 hindsight, so many writers covering the New
Deal era and the development of our current federal regulatory system note but rarely ex-
plore the importance of the 1935 Social Security Act. Robert L. Rabin in his monumental
study, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, devotes less than two pages to the topic,
although he acknowledges that
Social Security constituted a dramatic step in a society that still believed that public
welfare was inconsistent with the ethics of individualism. And, as a mass-coverage
federal welfare program, it was unprecedented.
38 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1250 (1986).
The subject gains only passing mention in Professor Friedman's seminal work, A HIS-
TORY OF AMERICAN LAW, despite the fact that the mention is capped by a halo:
The New Deal probably is the best and sharpest illustration of the way government
grew in response to consumer demand... The New Deal program was immensely
popular in its day; and what began in the 1930s has become so deeply ingrained in
American life that nobody dares touch the essential New Deal, not even a Republi-
can President as conservative as Ronald Reagan... The mere suggestion, by Barry
Goldwater, that he might alter the Social Security system (1964) was greeted with
outrage, as if he had befouled the Holy of Holies.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 658 (2d ed. 1985).
And yet, these honorable mentions stand out because they at least exist. Some noted
biographers of President Roosevelt have omitted all mention of the 1935 act. See FRANK
FREIDEL, FDR: LAUNCHING THE NEW DEAL (1973).
38. Statistics compiled from Current Operations Statistics, Quarterly Tables, 54 Soc.
SEC. BULL. June 1991, at 36, show payments in 1988 of a total of approximately $374 billion
in retirement, disability, and survivor benefits, unemployment benefits, temporary disability
benefits, workers compensation benefits, public assistance payments and SSI payments (id. at
38) paid to a total of approximately 50 million persons (id. at 43 n.10). These figures do not
include Medicare and Medicaid.
The various trust funds created under the SSAct have ended up serving as the federal
"piggy bank", used to offset mounting federal deficits. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
Trust Fund as of February 1991 showed total assets of more than $224 billion, yet showed a
cash balance of minus S160 million, id. at 41. The Disability Insurance Trust Fund as of
February 1991 showed total assets of approximately $11.7 billion, yet a cash balance of minus
$55.4 million, id. at 42. The Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (Medicare Part A) as of Febru-
ary 1991 showed total assets of S102.2 billion, and a cash balance of approximately $1.5
billion, id. at 43. The Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund (Medicare Part B) as of
February 1991 showed total assets of $16.6 billion, and a cash balance of approximately $239
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important corner. It had undertaken to construct a national safety
net for the destitute. This safety net had large holes in it, so many
still fell through. This safety net came perilously close to the
ground itself; so it did not provide much of a comfort margin. But
at least the federal government had made a start.
Naturally, lawyers of every description had comments and con-
cerns to express about this new legislation. In reviewing the Index
to Legal Periodicals for the period 1934 through 1940, more than
100 articles were published on various aspects of the new Social
Security Act. Typically, these articles debated the constitutionality
of the statute. Such discussion focused primarily on whether the
federal government had the authority to "coerce" state govern-
ments into adopting a certain type of legislation (for example, un-
employment compensation) through use of the federal taxing and
spending powers.3 9 Many others opined on the formidable task of
organizing accounts for millions of American citizens, tracking in-
dividual contributions into the accounts, and determining eligibility
and appropriate payments.' Noticeable by its near-absence is vir-
tually any discussion about needing structured agency and judicial
review in the event of dispute.
Initially, one might be tempted to suppose this apparent over-
sight stemmed from the fact that the due process revolution would
be 30-plus years in the future: Mathews v. Eldridge and Goldberg v.
Kelly .. 41 would not develop until four decades later. One might
assume that back in the latter 1930s, this supposed insurance pro-
gram was still seen fundamentally as a benefits program. As such,
million, id. at 44. The positive cash balances for the Medicare program have not always been
present.
In 1977, 1978, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1984, and 1986 through 1988, the Hospital Insurance
Trust Fund showed deficits ranging from approximately $738 million in 1977 to approxi-
mately $81 billion in 1982. During this time period it became clear that if the Medicare
program continued on its then-present course, the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund would be
bankrupt by the end of the 1990s. In 1982, the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund was com-
pelled to borrow $12 billion from the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund. This
loan was repaid in 1985 and 1986. Id. at 43.
39. Eg., Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong, The Federal Social Security Act and Its Consti-
tutionalAspects, CAL. L. REv. 247 (1936); Charles Denby, Jr., The Case Against the Constitu-
tionality of the Social Security Act, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (1936); Roger Sherman
Hoar, By-Products of the Social Security Decisions, 21 MARQ. L. REV. 215 (1937); Harry
Shulman, The Case for the Constitutionality of the Social Security Act, 3 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoBs. 298 (1936).
40. Eg., J. Douglas Brown, The Development of the Old-Age Insurance Provisions of the
Social Security Act, 3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 186 (1936); David Waldron, Social Security
Amendments of 1939: An Objective Analysis, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 83 (1939).
41. 397 U.S. 254 (1970); 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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one might assume that disputes about such benefits might not merit
the structured agency and judicial review which we, today, take as a
given.
Yet, players on that contemporary legislative and regulatory
stage did not view the matter so simplistically.
As alluded to earlier in this article, the principle that aggrieved
citizens must be heard fully and fairly did not spring full-born from
the brow of law professors writing in the 1960s. This principle is
deeply embedded in our philosophical and legal traditions. There-
fore, at the inauguration of the Act the Social Security Board in-
cluded appeals among its many broad functions. However, the
statute gave no details as to how the function should be carried
out.42 Moreover, the Board's actions in this area received scant
public attention.
Indeed, when Dean Wigmore produced a "Compilation of Prac-
tical Information That Should Be of Assistance to Lawyers Called
on to Advise the Citizen Whose Personal Interests May Be Affected
by the Actions of Forty or Fifty Administrative Bodies Now Func-
tioning in the Nation's Capital - [A] List of Principal Ones That
Hold Hearings, Adopt Regulations of Procedure and Render Deci-
sions Touching Private Interests - Their Functions, etc.," he was
unable to include rules and regulations of procedure and practice
before the Social Security Board. This stands in stark contrast to
the guidance available regarding most other agencies. Granted, the
Social Security Board did issue rulings. But those were published
42. The original Section 702 of Title VII, defining the duties of the Social Security
Board, merely stated:
The Board shall perform the duties imposed upon it by this Act and shall also have
the duty of studying and making recommendations as to the most effective methods
of providing economic security through social insurance, and as to legislation and
matters of administrative policy concerning old-age pensions, unemployment com-
pensation, accident compensation, and related subjects.
49 Stat. 636 (1935).
Section 703 added, with regard to expenses:
The Board is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of such officers and
employees, and to make such expenditures, as may be necessary for carrying out its
functions under this Act. Appointments of attorneys and experts may be made
without regard to the civil-service laws.
Id.
Under Title II, various provisions referred to the Social Security Board's role in assuring
the correctness of payments, eg., Section 202(c):
If the Board finds at any time that more or less than the correct amount has thereto-
fore been paid to any individual under this section, then, under regulations made by
the Board, proper adjustments shall be made in connection with subsequent pay-
ments under this section to the same individual.
49 Stat. 623 (1935).
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merely "in copious mimeograph Press Releases." '4 3
By 1939, Congress had amended Title II of the Social Security
Act to make procedural protections somewhat more explicit, rely-
ing less on implication. Key among those amendments, Congress
finally provided explicitly in Section 205 that the Social Security
Board - or its delegatee - shall hear and decide all disputes in
claims arising under the Act.' In what eventually became an im-
portant provision in the canons of administrative law,45 Congress
limited judicial review solely to claims which have crossed this stat-
utory portal. Claims brought outside of Section 205 could be
barred.
It is interesting to note how the role of the Social Security Board
in adjudications was viewed at the time. Significantly, few writers
on Social Security per se focused on this activity. Of course, a thor-
ough, detailed writer describing the program would at least mention
the quasi-judicial role of the Social Security Board. One writer did
go so far as to describe the types of questions typically brought
before the adjudicators in the Claims Operation Section of the Bu-
reau of Old-Age Insurance.' Most, though, merely accepted but
43. John H. Wigmore, Federal Administrative Agencie.: How to Locate Their Rules of
Practice and Their Rulings with Special Reference to Their Rules of Evidence, 25 A.B.A. J. 25,
27 n.10 (1939).
44. Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to
which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a re-
view of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mail-
ing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary
may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district court of the United States
... As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of
the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained
of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript
of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Sec-
retary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the
Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive...
42 U.S.C. 405(g) (1988).
45. The findings and decision of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon
all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of
the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency
except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or
any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of Title
28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1991) [the current codification for § 205]. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749 (1975) (holding that even constitutional issues must be raised through the jurisdic-
tional avenue of Sec. 205); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (holding that the APA
does not provide a basis of federal jurisdiction which can avoid the limitations of Social Se-
curity Act Section 205). See also Dina Lassow, Access to Federal Courts: The Impact of
Weinberger v. Salfi, 11 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 907 (March 1978).
46. There are a number of questions involved in the adjudication of claims arising
under this title. For example, there are the laws of absentees, the rights of widow
and minor children, the proof of age, adoption, aliens, assignments, records applica-
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had few policy recommendations concerning this aspect of the
program.
One attorney for the Federal Security Agency (the predecessor
of the Department of Health and Human Services) - albeit writing
"as an individual only" and expressing opinions that were "in no
sense binding upon" the agency - recognized the changes in a foot-
note to a lengthy article on the 1939 amendments. The procedural
changes added by statute were characterized as "important admin-
istrative changes" - but no more than that.47
In order to see the beginnings of concern about how the massive
dimensions of the Social Security program would compel a change
in the informal administration of agency justice, we must look to
the inauguration of the Administrative Procedure Act.
B. The View from the Parallel Track: The Emerging APA,
Administrative Adjudications, and Judicial Review
The same time period that saw the birth of the Social Security
Program also saw the birth of the federal Administrative Procedure
Act. The two statutes developed on roughly parallel time tracks,
except for the APA's temporary "derailment" during World War
II. Curiously enough, the two tracks rarely intersected in those
early days. Few seemed to recognize where common interests and
problems undergirded the two legislative efforts.
The APA was developed to rationalize a federal system which
was widely perceived as irrational and so expansive that one could
not, as an individual, force rationality upon it. The pre-APA sys-
tem not only failed to provide meaningful access for citizen appeals;
but, adding insult to injury, was inefficient. As the Committee on
ble to prove death and a host of other legal questions. For example, the adjudicator
acts not only as a juror but as a judge. From a legal standpoint of view, they must
determine the facts and adjudicate death claims upon the law in the state wherein
the applicant was domiciled at the time of death. Some of the common questions
are: (1) When is a person presumed to be dead? (2) Who is the survivor of a com-
mon disaster? Since there are 48 states, the adjudicators must necessarily know the
law of descent and distribution in each of the states. They must know the divorce
laws, laws of executors and administrators, and the jurisdiction of the court. The
Board will under certain circumstances protect the rights of minor children. The
appointment of guardians and committees will inevitably result. It may be well to
add that the exemption law, the laws governing husband and wife, infants, inheri-
tance taxes, marriage, and wills play a decided part in the adjudication of claims.
For example, was the testator competent to make a will? Does the state in which
the deceased lived recognize nuncupative wills? Was the will revoked? Does the
state recognize foreign wills?
James D. Hayes, Some Legal Aspects of the Social Security Act, 13 NOTRE DAME LAW. 272,
282 (1938).
47. Waldron, supra note 40, at 99 n.66.
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the Judiciary of the House of Representatives said during the course
of modeling the APA,
It is practically impossible for a Member of Congress, much less
an individual citizen, to find his way among these many agencies
or to locate the particular officer or employee in any of the agen-
cies with whom any particular problem should be discussed with
a view to settlement. ... [T]he condition has grown worse
within the past few years in the attempts that have been made to
meet serious economic and social problems.48
Yet few who decried the injustice and inefficiency of federal
agencies recognized that the Social Security Act raised the self-same
difficulties, multiplied many fold. It would soon overshadow all
previous burdens on the nation's patchwork system of administra-
tive justice.
Looking back at how various public committees approached the
task of overhauling the federal administrative system for the first
time offers instruction to us on similar efforts with the federal courts
system today. When Congress first seriously began to examine the
overall process for administrative adjudications and judicial review,
it found a situation of "indescribable confusion... due to the fact
that . ..since [1861] the Congress ha[d] created administrative
agencies without regard to any uniformity of the judicial review
provisions and without regard to the procedure developed and
proven prior to that time .... I In order to provide some uniform
48. JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H. R. REP. No.
1149, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939), as quoted in Report of the Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives (Chairman, Hatton W. Suiners, Texas), H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 243 (May 3, 1946).
49. From SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, PROVIDING FOR THE MORE EXPEDI-
TIOUS SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES wrrH THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
S. REP. No. 442, 76th Cong., Ist Sess., at 10 (1939), quoted in COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1946). More fully, the House endorsed
and adopted as still relevant the Senate's early findings, including:
The results of the lack of uniform procedure for the exercise of quasi-judicial power
by the administrative agencies have been at least threefold: (1) The respective ad-
ministrative agencies give little heed to, and are little assisted by, the decisions of
other administrative agencies or by the decisions of the courts applicable to such
agencies; (2) the courts are placed at considerable disadvantage because they must
verify the basic statutes of all decisions relating to other administrative agencies
which are cited to them, thus slowing up the writing of opinions in particular cases;
and (3) individuals and their attorneys are at a disadvantage in the presentation of
their administrative appeals, with the result that there is a tendency to emphasize
the importance of the judiciary in the administrative process.
We might also be tempted to endorse in our present day some of the criticism which that
1939 Senate report (again adopted by the House in 1946) levied at the causes for the "in-
describable confusion" in "administrative process." Namely, in addition to the causes cited
above, the Senate believed "What the law schools have placed undue emphasis on the patho-
logical aspect of administrative procedure rather than upon the statutes and the administra-
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procedure for the exercise of quasi-judicial power by agencies, and
to preserve courts from "unnecessary fumbling in the administra-
tive process"5 due to lack of clarity about the scope of their review,
Congress early on favored the gatekeeper model of a specialized
court. Although the 1930s proposal would have operated on a
larger scale, in many ways, this was the progenitor of the special-
ized Article I Social Security Court proposed by the Federal Courts
Study Committee in the 1990s.
In 1933, Sen. Norris of Nebraska, followed soon by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, proposed to improve administrative justice
through establishing what was variously called a "United States
Court of Administrative Justice" or a "Federal Administrative
Court." The exact features of this entity would change during the
ensuing decade of debate. But its general contours largely remained
as follows: Either directly or through "appropriate branches", the
administrative court would "take over or review the judicial func-
tions of the multitudinous Federal administrative tribunals."51
This, then, was the general administrative procedure proposal
which lawyers, bureaucrats, scholars and politicians had "on the
table" during the earliest years of the Social Security program.
Naturally, this proposal spurred significant discussion about how
administrative adjudication and judicial review should be handled.
1. Keeping the Doors of the Courthouse Open
In fact, in 1939 the American Bar Association's Erskine M.
Ross Essay Competition solicited responses on the subject: "To
What Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies be Re-
viewable by the Courts?" Five essays were published in a series in
the ABA JOURNAL. 52 One especially stands out for its enduring
quality and relevance. In addition, that same essay marks the out-
standing contribution of Kenneth Culp Davis when he was a young
professor at the College of Law of West Virginia University.
The Davis essay (which did not win the competition, but did
gain an honorable mention) was the only one of the five squarely to
tive processes. Added to all this has been the constantly growing complexity of the Federal
Government and the resulting lack of training of most lawyers and businessmen therein." Id.
50. Id.
51. 58 A.B.A. Rep. 203 (1933), as quoted in Hearings Before the Committee on the Judi-
ciary House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., at 63 (June 21, 25 & 26, 1945).
52. Watson Clay, To What Extent Should the Decisions of Administrative Bodies be Re-
vievwable by the Courts?, 25 A.B.A. J. 940 (1939); Kenneth C. Davis, [same title], 25 A.B.A. J.
770 (1939); Clyde Duffy, [same title], 25 A.B.A. J. 838 (1939); Malcolm McDermott, [same
title], 25 A.B.A. J. 453 (1939); John L. Seymour, [same title], 25 A.B.A. J. 1018 (1939).
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address the growing need to assure administrative and judicial pro-
cess for review of claims against the government which "shade" be-
tween right and privilege, such as "old age insurance from a fund to
which an employee has contributed. 51 3 As he opined,
Even if these matters are properly denominated privileges, they
are not clearly in the nature of bounties and their grant or denial
is frequently as important as the disposition of so-called vested
rights. More accurate than the usual assertion that reviewability
of questions of privilege should be relatively restricted is the
statement that as the strength or weakness of the element of priv-
ilege in any question varies, so should reviewability vary.54
All five essayists and virtually all other writers during the 1933-
46 period recognized that whatever administrative system we de-
vised must provide for some judicial review of agency action. For
example, as Davis pointed out, adopting Judge Rosenberry's fa-
mous quote, "In the estimation of English-speaking people gener-
ally, a right of review is no less sacred than the right to be heard in
the first instance."55 Throughout the discussions in this decade and
a half, the only real issue was how to define the scope of judicial
review, not whether to have such review or not.
2. The Very Serious Numbers Game
Some writers recognized that sheer numerical growth provided
the driving force pushing both for more judicial access in the name
of justice and against it in the name of efficiency. The words of the
President of the American Bar Association in 1937 could very well
have been spoken today:
[I]t is conceded that the growth of administrative law is the out-
standing legal phenomenon of the twentieth century - some au-
thorities even say more decisions are being made by
administrative tribunals than by the ordinary courts.... 56
How are administrative agencies able to process so many more
cases than the courts, even though the factual matters may be much
more complex than the average civil case?
53. Davis, supra note 52, at 778.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, The Bar and the Public, 23 A.B.A. J. 871, 873 (1937). He
also expressed concern about the lack of administrative law courses in ABA-approved
schools, and that, when offered, they were optional. "The conclusion seems inescapable that
most of our students are leaving their law schools without any adequate grasp of the out-
standing legal phenomenon of the twentieth century." Mr. Vanderbilt's words bear a striking
similarity to the address by Justice Byron White at Oklahoma City University School of Law
Convocation, August 31, 1991. Transcript on file in OCU School of Law Law Review office.
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According to one writer who had served in high-level presiden-
tial appointments, efficiency owed to the fact that agency proceed-
ings were "much more informal" than the courts. Notwithstanding
this informality, the agencies provided proceedings "similar to those
daily occurring in the courts with the difference that the staff as well
as the deciding officials were specialists in the particular class of
cases and that they were not hampered by technical rules of evi-
dence or procedure."57 These agency hearings were conducted with
the procedures that became a part of the APA: the power to sum-
mon and to permit cross-examination of witnesses, the power to
subpoena documents, to hear arguments on fact and law, all on a
written record. That record, in turn, was the exclusive record re-
viewed by a federal court on appeal.
To illustrate the power of this process, as compared with com-
mon law techniques, the writer drew an example from contempo-
rary experience. Looking at 1936, the Court of Claims (5 judges
and 6 commissioners) disposed of 473 cases tried de novo, while the
Customs Court (9 judges) wrote 3,500 opinions disposing of 71,492
cases, using informal administrative procedures.5"
57. Col. O.1K McGuire, Judicial Reviews of Administrative Decisions, 26 GEo. L.J. 574,
596 (1938).
58. Id. at 576. Elsewhere, Col. McGuire describes in some helpful detail the even more
informal process of resolving disputes between the regulator and the regulated. He offered a
tangible description of informal adjudication in the "permanent structure of the Federal Gov-
ernment" which is the "bureaucracy, so called," that "necessarily administers the details of
the laws." See id. at 594.
The technical procedure today in the older agencies of adjusting a controversy be-
tween the Government and the citizen arising under any statute is substantially the
procedure followed in the earlier days when the public business was small. In sub-
stance, that procedure was, and is, for the aggrieved party to send a written state-
ment to the particular department in Washington; for some subordinate employee
to refer that letter to the official or employee with whom the controversy arose; for
such an official or employee to make a written report admitting or controverting the
statements made in the complaint; and for some departmental employee or board of
employees to prepare a decision on these exparte statements for some higher official
or the head of the particular agency to sign after it has been reviewed by some
intermediate officer or employee.
Under such a procedure, the complainant does not know what is contained in the
report made by the subordinate in the field; the complainant has no opportunity to
summon witnesses, place his testimony in the record, and to cross examine the Gov-
ernment witnesses. The deciding officer is deprived of the benefit which would ac-
crue from such a record and he is generally deprived of the benefit of any brief or
argument by the complainant or his attorney on the law and the facts. As one
department of the government today has 603,000 such cases, the head of that de-
partment could not even sign the decisions much less read the records. It is quite
infrequent for the head of a department even to know that such cases are pending in
his department, much less attempt to personally determine any considerable
number of them. All of this work is assigned to subordinates in the departmental
service as it necessarily must be. That was the system in the early days and that is
the system today after nearly one hundred and fifty years of operation.
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This same writer, who was also Chairman of the ABA Special
Committee on Administrative Law from 1935-37, seemed to see
even more clearly than most that the sheer quantity of controversies
between the regulators and the regulated compelled better adminis-
trative procedure within the agencies so as not to overwhelm the
federal judiciary with matters requiring de novo (or otherwise exten-
sive) review. He noted the Department of Labor (DOL) as an ex-
ample of how an appropriate model could develop to manage a fast-
growing docket of administrative cases. The Department of Labor
was at that time "the youngest and one of the smallest of the execu-
tive departments of the Government." Nevertheless, during FY
1936, "it had 34,601 controversies - or approximately one and one
half times as many as all of the federal civil cases concluded by all
of the federal constitutional ourts.. ." 9 To cope with this vol-
ume of cases, the agency and Congress adopted a combination of
interdepartmental review (resulting in a solid administrative record)
and a fairly narrow scope of judicial review based solely on that
record.
In a further parallel to our own times, this former chairman of
the ABA committee which developed the administrative court pro-
posal cautioned that Congress must take into account the burden
posed by the substance-abuse cases of their day. He first noted that
demographics and the expansion of government economic and so-
cial support would increase the volume of civil cases arising in ad-
ministrative agencies. Next, he cautioned that this natural increase
in caseload would jump when combined with criminal cases arising
because of Prohibition. He warned that the court system of the
1930s would surely be "swamped" unless other appropriate means
were developed to limit judicial access.' In our day, the tidal wave
of criminal cases which overload the federal docket are cocaine-re-
lated litigation.61
Id. at 593.
59. Id. at 578.
60. To throw these cases into the courts as soon as there was disagreement with the
administrative operating officer would place the courts in a far worse condition than
they were in when the Prohibition Amendment to the Constitution was repealed. It
is a matter of common knowledge that when such repeal took place, the district
courts and even the circuit courts of appeal were hopelessly behind with their dock-
ets by reason of such prohibition cases coming from but one bureau of the Federal
Government.
Id. at 580.
61. REPORT, supra note 1, at 160.
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3. The Point of Intersection
For our purposes, the most helpful and foresightful analysis of
the proposed antecedent to the APA was a 1940 article by Professor
Breck P. McAllister briefly reviewing a sample of agencies disburs-
ing money to individuals, asking what would be the anticipated im-
pact of the proposed legislation. For the first time we encounter
someone who recognized the quiet giant at the table. For the first
time an outside observer clearly noted the important intersection of
problems undergirding both pieces of legislation.
Looking at the Third Annual Report of the Social Security
Board in 1938, Professor McAllister found that more than
41,700,000 account numbers had been assigned. By dint of sheer
numbers he saw plainly that "the dealing of this Board with individ-
uals [would] soon dwarf the extensive operations of the agencies
already considered." Although Prof. McAllister referred here most
immediately to the Veterans' Administration and Railroad Retire-
ment Board, his larger discussion encompassed the full range of fed-
eral administrative agencies. He cautioned that "[iln the light of
this portentous fact, it is important to know just what effects will be
produced by the bill before it is handed to this agency to be put into
effect in the conduct of its extensive operations."62
He became even more wary about the impact of administrative
procedure on this giant because still another "growth spurt" was
underway. Until January 1, 1940, the Social Security Board, under
the Old-Age Insurance System, had only been making lump-sum
payments. Beginning in 1940 there would also be regular monthly
payments. This increase in frequency of government-citizen inter-
action would inevitably increase the "multitude of contested issues"
- and, in turn, the need for improved "administrative machinery
necessary to translate the objectives of the Act into a going
concern."
63
Would the Social Security Board as then constituted be able to
accommodate the increased volume of contested matters? Surely
not. Therefore, the writer made inquiries to the General Counsel of
the Federal Security Agency. Prof. McAllister discovered that the
agency was in the process of developing a proposal - "still in a
tentative stage" - to create "a new Hearing and Review Division
62. Breck P. McAllister, Administrative Adjudication and Judicial Review, 34 ILL. L.
REv. oF Nw. U. 680, 685 (1940).
63. Id. at 685.
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of the Social Security Board."" This 3-member Appeals Council
would be the delegated body under Section 205(g) of the Act to
hear and resolve disputes when a claimant was dissatisfied with the
results of his hearing before a referee.
The actual Appeals Council was established in 1940. But it,
along with the referees operating under it, seemed unable to drain
the swamp of administrative adjudications which had been
predicted.
C. The Post-War Calm: Years of Quiet Desperation?
1. The APA as Adopted
The APA was enacted in 1946, essentially as we know it today:
with judicial review for substantial evidence in support of the
agency's action and without a gatekeeper intermediary administra-
tive court. As with so many events of the post-war period, hopes
were high that this legislation would usher in a period of relative
calm. The "indescribable confusion" caused by the sudden prolifer-
ation of agencies during the New Deal had at least become routine.
Some New Deal agencies had faded into judicially-favored sunset
(e.g., the NRA). Most agencies simply had found their activities
somehow swallowed up into the war effort. As is ever the wont of
wars on the homefront, World War II (as did World War I and the
Civil War previously) expanded the size and reach of the federal
bureaucracy under emergency conditions that fairly well assured
public acceptance. Long after the military engagement ended, how-
ever, those enlarged bureaucratic structures - and the public's tol-
erance of them - remained.65
Was it, then, a war-related shift in zeitgeist which led to the en-
actment of an APA without one or more administrative courts, as
had been proposed in the early days of the Social Security Act?
It might be nigh impossible to identify and objectify the changes
in the socio-political atmosphere which lead to changes in legisla-
tion. Yet, when we look at the legislative history for the 1946 act,
we see that during the New Deal period both houses of Congress
squarely supported their own model (similar to the ABA's) of estab-
lishing an Article III administrative court. This Article III court
would consist of a chief justice and 10 associate justices, replacing
the circuit courts of appeals and district courts for 15 to 20 enumer-
ated agencies. The court would have been divided into sections,
64. Id. at 685, n.16.
65. See Rabin, supra note 37, at 1229-71.
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creating specialized courts according to subject matter, under the
general umbrella of the administrative court. In fact, this proposal
passed the House and Senate in 1939 and 1940, only to be vetoed by
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
President Roosevelt had already directed Attorney General
Tom Clark to select a committee of "eminent" persons to study and
make suggestions for improving the administrative process. That
final report was completed in 1941. "During the war years 1942-43
the subject was necessarily in abeyance; but war legislation, admin-
istration, and congressional investigations brought administrative
processes more and more into prominence."66
In 1945, a revised and ultimately successful bill was introduced.
That revised bill did not contain a centralized court, and applied to
most agencies; exemptions were according to subject matter, not
name.67 It was debated through the following year, with numerous
references to the "late President Roosevelt" and his "farseeing and
rich vision."6
That vision included a caution against the creation of a "fourth
branch" of administrative agencies uncontrolled by constitutional
limits. In particular, the President and his Committee on Adminis-
trative Management and the later Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure expressed concern that "insidious and
far reaching... evils" result from confusion of the administrative
and judicial functions of agencies. In order to assure "public confi-
dence" in the fairness of the process, the agency procedures must be
fair from the outset. Otherwise, the conduct of the agency could
well "lie under the suspicion of being rationalizations of [its] prelim-
inary findings .... "69
President Roosevelt and his committee(s) were so concerned
about the need to protect the adjudicatory process from politiciza-
tion that they proposed something which even the Federal Courts
66. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives (Chairman,
Hatton W. Sumners, Texas). H. R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., at 248 (May 3,
1946).
67. Section 4 of the 1946 Act stated that with regard to rulemaking,
This section applies, accordingly to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that
there is involved (1) any military naval, or foreign affairs function of the United
States or (2) any matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324 § 460 Stat. 237 (1946), repealed (1966), recodified in 5
U.S.C. §§ 551-76, §§ 701-06 (1988).
68. H. R. RP. No. 1980, supra note 66, at 379. See also id. at 79, 241-42, 244, 299,
313, 351, 372, 381.
69. Id. at 242.
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Study Committee today has not fully adopted: Completely separate
the judicial function of an agency into a section wholly independent
of the department and independent of executive control.7" This
seemed the most reliable long-term method of protecting against the
pernicious encroachment of political agendas upon the judging
function.
The Federal Courts Study Committee acknowledged the need to
insulate decisionmakers in the adjudicatory process. Granted,
prosecutorial and judging functions usually enjoy some measure of
separation within modern federal agencies. Nevertheless, the poli-
cies and politics which drive the prosecutorial function now often
seep into the judicial function through bureaucratic and other man-
agement pressures. As the 1990 Report notes, "recent experience
suggests that the process is vulnerable to unhealthy political con-
trol." The ALJ before whom a claimant presents his disability case
is an employee of the Social Security Administration. The SSA has
made "controversial efforts to limit the number and amount of
claims granted" by the ALTs. If the claimant seeks review by the
Appeals Council of the SSA, she encounters a body that "lacks even
the protection that the Administrative Procedures Act gives the ad-
ministrative law judges." All in all, the situation has led to wide-
spread fears that the judges' proper independence has been
compromised.71
Notwithstanding these stinging cautions, the Federal Courts
Study Committee stopped just short of squarely endorsing full inde-
pendence. The Committee suggested that Congress "may wish to
consider creating an independent agency in the executive branch to
employ all" federal ALJs. Yet even this step towards independence
wore hobbles. The Committee suggested that limits be enforced by
disciplinary measures, "to prevent individual judges from abusing
their independence." Retreating even farther from the idea of total
separation, the Committee suggested that, alternatively, Congress
may prefer to develop further safeguards within the agency itself to
insulate the decisions of SSA ALJs in disability cases from the "in-
fluence of agency superiors. "72
Interestingly, neither the 1937-41 administrative committees
nor the 1989-90 federal courts committee focused on whether it is
appropriate to limit judicial review of agency decisions when the
70. Id.
71. REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
72. Id. at 56.
[Vol. 3:339
SOCIAL SECURITY & MEDICARE
influence of agency political agendas is deeply embedded in bureau-
cratic, fiscal and management controls. Oddly enough, the New
Deal committees and Congress perhaps came closer to a direct re-
sponse. The 1946 House Report reminded readers that even in
1938 the Senate had recognized that to achieve fairness the adminis-
trative process had to be controlled "at its source." The House had
called for "legal and enforceable guides for administrative officers
and agents in their daily operations," which perhaps might even
render further litigation "unnecessary.""3 Assuredly, these do not
count as "fighting words"; but the House Judiciary Committee in
recommending adoption of what became our current APA asked
that the recommendations of Roosevelt's committee be preserved,
for they were of "permanent importance."'74
In the compromise that formed the permanent law, Congress
created a special class of semi-independent hearing officers and con-
ferred numerous procedural protections in the hearing process. Ju-
dicial review was based on the administrative record developed in
the adjudication below. Such review was to be based on whether
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the adjudica-
tor's decision.75
2. Post-War Social Security Adjudications and the APA
If the legislators who enacted the APA in 1946 expected a pe-
riod of post-war calm on the agency front, did Social Security com-
ply? Generally, yes, it did. From the remainder of the decade
throughout the 1950s claims under all titles of the Social Security
Act appeared to have settled into an increasingly reliable routine.
The constitutional, statutory, and philosophical appropriateness of
that routine would not come under searching scrutiny until another
decade or more.
Meanwhile, in 1946 Congress abolished the Social Security
Board, and transferred its functions within the Federal Security
Agency to the Federal Security Adminstrator.76 In 1953, Congress
created the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
73. H. R. REP. No. 1980, supra note 66, at 242.
74. Id.
75. Under Section 10(e) of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act [APA], the review-
ing court "shall... (B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be ... (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to requirements of
sections 7 and 8 [concerning procedure for hearings and decisions] or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute .. " APA, Pub. Law No. 404, § 10(e),
60 Stat. 237, 243-44 (1946).
76. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1946, § 4, 60 Stat. 1095-96 (1946).
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(HEW).7 7 The SSAct, in all its titles, had "arrived", as indicated by
the institutional symbols of power which mattered most in Wash-
ington, D.C.: a cabinet-level agency with a name that announced
(1) its mission and (2) that it was a major item in the federal budget.
For the first time the federal government had unequivocally lent its
power to the word which New Dealers had fastidiously avoided -
"welfare." Those welfare programs, plus most of the health pro-
grams which existed in the 1950s and would develop in the 1960s
(chiefly, Medicare and Medicaid) all came under the authority of
the 1935 Social Security Act, as amended. Furthermore, they each
were subject to the judicial review provisions of Section 205(h) and
the process for administrative adjudication which the Secretary es-
tablished pursuant to Section 205(g).
The 1950s saw the next real "growth spurt" for the quiet giant.
In 1956, Congress expanded the SSAct beyond the original old-age
benefits, and beyond rehabilitation services, to provide monthly
cash benefits to disabled workers who were 50 or older, but not yet
at retirement age. The threshold for coverage continued to lower
until by 1960 dependents and workers younger than 50 could qual-
ify.78 Accordingly, in the period 1957-1960, 340,000 more persons
were added to the SSA caseload.79
As we have seen, though, the expansion of government benefits
to many more millions of potentially eligible persons also expands
the controversies the regulatory agency must handle. With disabil-
ity claims, procedures for formal adjudications centered on the "ref-
eree" (today known as the administrative law judge or "AIJ").
The referee conducted hearings much in the informal-formal man-
ner described in well-handled adjudications preceding the APA.80
According to Social Security regulations, the referee was bound to
"inquire fully into the matters at issue", "receive evidence" by
sworn testimony of witnesses and/or by documentation. The order
and exact procedure at the hearing were - and are still - at the
discretion of the referee. As with most administrative adjudication,
federal rules of evidence and procedure did not apply."'
The referee in the 1950s often times was not an attorney. He
77. Reorganization Plan No. I of 1953, § 1, 67 Stat. 631-631 (1953).
78. Social Security Amendments of 1956, See. 223, 70 Stat. 815 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 416 (1991)); Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, 72 Stat. 1021 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1991)); Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74
Stat. 967 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1991)).
79. See supra note 38, at 52.
80. See McGuire, supra note 57.
81. 20 C.F.R. § 403.709 (1958).
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was an employee of HEW's Social Security Administration, special-
izing in Social Security law. Whom did the referee represent? Usu-
ally neither the government nor the citizen had an attorney present
to act as advocate. The referee, ostensibly, served as a natural arbi-
ter. The referee's conduct in handling the case was subject to the
provisions of the APA concerning selection of hearing officers or
ALJs.
2
If a claimant was dissatisfied with the referee's decision, she
could appeal the decision to the Appeals Council, which at that
time was a 9-member body acting in panels of three.8 3 From the
Appeals Council's decision, appeal could be taken to federal district
court specifically for review under the substantial evidence
standard.
Twenty years before, when the ABA and Congress proposed to
establish a centralized administrative court with specialized subject
matter divisions, the legal community focused much energy on the
need to assure fairness and neutrality in the adjudicatory process -
even before appeal to a higher court. The agency decision-makers
had to be insulated from political influences, with due separation of
prosecutorial and judging functions, in order to assure a reliable
outcome. At that time, even though discussions did not highlight
the Social Security program itself, observers consistently argued for
the general need to overcome, in John Foster Dulles' words, the
"inadequacies of the 'trial examiner' system."84
82. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1977) et seq.; see generally CHARLES I. SCHOTrLAND and EWELL
T. BARTLETr, FEDERAL SOCIAL SECURrrY; A GUIDE TO LAW AND PROCEDURE at 118-133
(1959). Schottland was a former Commissioner of the SSA during the Eisenhower adminis-
tration. As Verkiel, et al, explains in their report on The Federal Administrative Judiciary,
Despite the characterization of benefit decisionmaking as largely institutional,
Congress has, from the late 1930s, required that Social Security claimants be af-
forded an opportunity to be heard when disputes about coverage or amounts arose.
Accordingly, when the APA was enacted in 1946, it was understood that hearings
under the Social Security Act would be presided over by APA-qualified hearing
examiners.
The relatively small volume of cases SSA handled prior to the enactment of the
disability coverage provisions in 1956 made the matter of APA coverage one of less
than critical importance. The enactment of the disability program, however, gener-
ated a large increase in adjudications, because the standard for disability has proved
extremely hard to define at the edges. Since then, the SSA's volume of adjudica-
tions has risen dramatically. Under pressure of this rising caseload, Congress in
1958 and 1959 extended two one-year authorizations to the SSA to employ non-
APA hearing examiners.
Verkuil, supra, note 18, at 27.
83. 20 C.F.R. § 403.710 (1958). The Appeals Council today has 20 members.
84. John F. Dulles, Administrative Law: A Practical Attitude For Lawyers, 25 A.B.A. J.
275, 282 (1939); see also Albert S. Faught, Classification of Administrative Bodies for Purposes
of Judicial Review, 6 U. Prrr. L. Rlv. 67, 73 (1940).
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The underlying concern about the need to separate functions did
not evaporate. President Eisenhower's second Hoover Commission
in 1955 had renewed the recommendation for separate administra-
tive courts. The call against politicization of quasi-judicial func-
tions had not died. It simply spoke in much more muted tones,
compared to the prior decades.
Thus, as both the Social Security Act and the Administrative
Procedures Act were coming of age, paradoxically, the trial exam-
iner method of adjudication formed the dominant mode of formal
hearings for citizen-government disputes in HEW. And, unlike the
early, formative years before the 1946 APA, one finds fewer legal
articles focusing attention on this issue.
Perhaps that lack of articles owed to the fact that the constitu-
tional status of Social Security benefits and other titles under the
SSAct had not yet been fully and finally resolved by the Supreme
Court. Formal "fair hearing" adjudications were subject to the
APA, which also lent its job protection to SSA hearing officers
(referees). Further, if the trial examiner method had resulted in se-
riously flawed decisions, the federal courts could make right the
error.
But another factor perhaps played a part: volume. The sheer
volume of cases potentially affected by the pernicious "evils" of the
trial examiner method were few compared to the total body of con-
troversies facing HEW's Social Security Administration.
Finally, even to the extent that the APA might have applied to
HEW's proceedings at that time, the genuine bulk of the emerging
giant was not represented by the formal hearing process. Most So-
cial Security controversies were handled - as in almost all federal
agencies - in the truly informal mode that federal agencies had
used for many decades. As described supra in footnote 58, the per-
manent structure of the federal bureaucracy worked ex parte, solely
on paper, usually without benefit of attorney input concerning law
or fact. This was typically how hundreds of thousands of disputes
were disposed of annually. Otherwise, the machinery of govern-
ment would grind nearly to a halt.
Did the choice of efficiency in formal and informal adjudications
work an injustice to the individual claimants? Undoubtedly, it
sometimes did. Yet, the decade was curiously quiet, compared to
the vibrant tumult of the early years. However, that quiet did not
last much longer.
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D. The Quiet Giant Finds Its Voice(s)
The 1960s and '70s witnessed the maturation of the SSAct,
along the lines originally envisioned for it in the 1930s. As Presi-
dent Roosevelt and his Committee on Economic Security had
sketched the grand design, in time the SSAct would provide for a
reasonable, comprehensive safety net for the American public: un-
employment compensation, old-age benefits, welfare and supportive
services for children without fathers, expanded public health serv-
ices, and national health insurance.8 5 Eventually, they had envi-
sioned that the SSAct would offer some basic level of support for
the nation's most vulnerable citizens, an undertaking which Euro-
pean nations had long ago assumed.8 6
The United States, however, remained a long way from estab-
lishing a truly comprehensive and sturdy safety net similar to the
European models. More to the point of this article's task, though,
we were clearly not yet ready to adopt a more European model for
processing the large volume of claims which a national health and
welfare benefits system entailed. Nor were we yet ready to limit
judicial review, vesting meaningful appellate review in a high-level
administrative tribunal or specialized court. Naturally, in our ro-
bust democratic tradition, an unwillingness to act did not hinder
our willingness to debate.
Thus, as our erstwhile "quiet giant", the Social Security Act,
matured, many conflicting voices spoke on what needed to be done
to achieve bureaucratic justice within the safety net. Reduced to
most basic levels, the discussions represented a bipolar dynamic. It
could be presented schematically below:
On one pole were tens of millions of individuals applying annually
for benefits under the SSAct's various titles. Along with them on
this pole were increasing numbers of suppliers, practitioners (i.e,
physicians), and institutional providers (hospitals, nursing homes)
of services rendered to beneficiaries. On the other pole were the
Social Security Trust Funds, 7 which beneficiaries and providers,
85. See supra note 14.
86. Eg., Barbara N. Armstrong, Old-Age Security Abroad: The Background of Titles 11
and P11 of the Social Security Act, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175 (1936).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
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etc., looked to for payment under the various titles. Who spoke for
whom in this increasingly tense dynamic?
Sometimes it was the President, directly or through appointed
commissions or committees, who spoke on behalf of expanding cov-
erage to millions of citizens. Sometimes members of the House or
Senate, responding to the expressed needs of their constituents,
spoke through legislative reforms that expanded coverage and eased
access to review. Other times, it was the citizens themselves who
spoke with most lasting effect in litigation mounted by private attor-
neys and by entities such as the National Welfare Rights Organiza-
tion, the Gray Panthers, or Legal Services Corporation.
Of course, increasing the numbers of citizens who could expect
to receive some level of support from the Trust Funds often was
politically less risky than decreasing the drain on the Funds. Yet,
certainly someone also had to speak on behalf of that concern. This
role fell to the Secretary of HEW, which in 1979 became HHS.8"
The Secretary had the statutory obligation to "insure that each of
the Trust Funds and the general fund in the Treasury have borne
their proper share of the costs, incurred during [the] fiscal year, for
the part of the administration of" Titles II, XVI, and XVIII (disa-
bility and Medicare programs).89 Translated into operational
terms, that meant: (1) assuring the financial solvency of all the vari-
ous programs under the SSAct; while at the same time (2) imple-
menting managerial systems for promptly processing tens of
millions of claims annually; and still (3) providing for the orderly,
fair and consistent in-house resolution of disputes.
Caught in the middle of these conflicting voices were the agency
adjudicators: the Department employees known variously (depend-
ing upon decade) as referees, hearing officers, or ALJs and the Ap-
peals Council. As the reach of the safety net broadened, and new
in-house tribunals were established, that tension followed to the
new arenas, emerging later at Medicare's Provider Reimbursement
Review Board (PRRB).90
88. See Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. Law No. 96-88, § 508, 93
Stat. 668, 692 (1979).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 401(g)(1)(A)(i) (1991).
90. This bipolar dynamic at the PRRB is discussed more fully in Part IV infra. How-
ever, I beg to add here a personal note. It seems so appropriate to the present discussion that
if the exchange had not happened in reality, a law professor would have had to invent this
story as a pedagogical anecdote.
My swearing-in (March 1986) as a Member of the PRRB was a relaxed and blessedly
informal affair, to offset the seriousness of the task ahead. To lighten the afternoon, the
Secretary's Chief of Staff turned to me after the oath was completed, shook my hand and
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According to the most elementary legal doctrine, the legislative
branch makes the laws and the executive branch carries them out.
Therefore, Congress' statutory mandates ought to govern how the
Secretary's regulations, manual provisions, other agency instruc-
tions and procedures implement the legislative design. Yet, some-
times the two bodies of law - legislative and administrative -
conflicted. How far could agency adjudicators reach as they at-
tempted (sometimes creatively) to interpret administrative instruc-
tions in a way which favors the broader congressional mandate over
the narrower agency practice?
This crucial question expressed the bipolar dynamic as it
emerged in the legal forum. This question went to the crux of the
tension between doing justice in increasing numbers of individual
cases and processing efficiently increasing billions of dollars of
claims against the government.
Eventually, it appeared that the answer, many believed, de-
pended more upon the institutional independence of the adjudica-
tors than upon full access to Article III court review of the
adjudication. Thus, by the 1980s calls for the establishment of a
specialized court for SSAct claims (all titles, or some titles) had a
ring of familiarity. 91 The Federal Courts Study Committee's rec-
ommendation was only the latest in a series.
In this section we shall trace how the safety net was broadened
through the front door. In the next section, Part IV, shall ex-
amine the counter pressure in the bipolar dynamic, namely, indica-
tions that through subtle legal and managerial efforts the safety net
may be narrowed - through the back door. Because Medicare
Part A represents the bulk of program monies spent on govern-
ment-financed health insurance, and because few commentators
have recently analyzed the procedural concerns raised here as those
concerns relate to Part A, Part IV shall focus solely on the bipolar
dynamic at the PRRB.
winked, "Now, look after the Trust Fund." Immediately following, the chief lobbyist for the
health care trade association which had nominated me shook my hand and jested, "Look
after the hospitals."
91. See, eg., Robert E. Rains, A Specialized Court for Social Security? A Critique of
Recent Proposals, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 1 (1987); J. P. Ogilvy, The Social Security Court
Proposak A Critique, 9 J. LEGIS. 229 (1982); Frederick B. Arner, The Social Security Court
Proposak An Answer to a Critique, 10 J. LEGIs. 324 (1983). A separate court was established
to review veterans' claims in 1988. See Note, New Veterans Legislation Opens Door to Judi-
cial Review ... Slowlyl, 67 WASH. L. Rnv. 889 (1989).
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1. Broadening the Safety Net - Through the Front Door
a. Legislation
Completing a last major agendum during his administration,
President Eisenhower convened in 1960 a White House Conference
on Aging. This conference focused its primary efforts on the issue
of financing health care for the elderly, a topic which Congress had
already taken up.
In the Social Security Amendments of 1960,92 the proposals
which in time were enacted as the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams made their debut. The amendments authored by Sen. Robert
S. Kerr (D-Okla) and Rep. Wilbur Mills (D-Ark) expanded existing
arrangements whereby state welfare authorities reimbursed physi-
cians and hospitals for services provided to the aged who were on
public or old-age assistance. The Kerr-Mills bill additionally used
this model to establish a new program whereby states could reim-
burse the medical expenses of elderly citizens who were "medically
indigent" but not on public assistance. Initially, Congress had envi-
sioned the federal role to be fairly limited. It would act mostly as a
financial underwriter, making grants-in-aid from general federal
revenues to state welfare departments on a matching basis.93
If that failed to garner sufficient state support, then the position
backed by others, including then-Senator John Kennedy, would
have a second chance. This latter proposal would have wholly fed-
eralized health insurance for the aged and tied it to Social Security
Old-Age, Survivors' and Disability Insurance (OASDI). Further, it
92. Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924-997. Although this section of the article offers a
historical look at the development of the Medicare program, it does not examine the intrica-
cies of program structure, benefits, payments and financing. Instead, we only look at those
insofar as they relate to the legal issues of concern. The reader interested in gaining a deeper,
and quite balanced, view of those aspects should see Marian Gornick, et al., Twenty Years of
Medicare and Medicaid: Covered Populations, Use of Benefits, and Program Expenditures, 6
HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 13 (1985 Annual Supp.). Ms. Gornick is Director, Division of
Beneficiary Studies, Office of Research, HCFA. She has been involved in Medicare and
Medicaid research since 1966.
93. For one perceptive report on the conflicts and cross-currents at the conference, see
Benjamin B. Kendrick, Emerging Issues in Social Security, 15 C.L.U. J. 124 (1961). This
piece was written while Kendrick was Assistant Director of Research at the Life Insurance
Association of America. Earlier, he had been Chief of Program Coordination for the Social
Security Board's Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors' Insurance.
As perhaps is human nature, the political, legal and social commentators often discounted
the gloomier views of actuaries. Kendrick's cautions in 1961 about the "long-run hazards" of
"legislative excess" that may have over-expanded Social Security beyond actuarial expecta-
tions are interesting.
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would have provided a legislative basis for eventually expanding
such federal health insurance to the American population generally.
Although the White House Conference and Congress supported
Kerr-Mills, many states lagged in adopting implementing legisla-
tion. Thus, although President Kennedy continued to support lib-
eralization of the SSAct to include health care reimbursements for
the elderly and poor, it fell to President Lyndon Johnson to bring
the final Medicare94 and Medicaid95 provisions to enactment. Us-
ing his consummate wiles as a legislator, his recent landslide vic-
tory, and (reminiscent of the passage of the APA following
President Roosevelt's death) President Kennedy's memory, John-
son managed to overcome the opposition of those who feared "so-
cialized medicine."96
As Prof. Kinney explains in her article on the structure of the
Medicare appeals system, "[t]he political circumstances surround-
ing the passage of the Medicare and Medicaid programs helps ex-
plain the programs' design." 97 Originally, the House had proposed
the 1960 version: reimburse inpatient hospital services for the aged.
This became Part A of the Medicare program. To gain the backing
of Republicans, Medicare was expanded to pay for outpatient physi-
cian services. This became Medicare Part B. The National Medical
Association, followed eventually by the American Medical Associa-
tion, supported expanding existing state medical assistance pro-
grams for the poor, regardless of age. This became the Medicaid
94. Supra note 4.
95. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Title XIX, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1396p (1992)).
96. Wilbur J. Cohen, known as "one of the principal architects of Medicare and Medi-
caid" recalled on the 20th anniversary of the programs the opposition which the proposals
encountered:
It is difficult for many younger people today to realize how harsh many of the
criticisms and arguments against these health proposals were. For instance, the
Scripps-Howard newspapers on June 20, 1966, had an article with the headline
'AMA Sees Wilbur Cohen as "Enemy No. One."' At the 1966 American Medical
Association House of Delegates, resolutions were introduced by physicians from
Florida and Louisiana asking 'President Johnson to launch an investigation of Mr.
Cohen, culminated by a swift booting out of office.'
Wilbur J. Cohen, Reflections on the Enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, HEALTH CARE
FIN. REV. 3 (1985 Ann. Supp.).
97. Kinney, supra note 6. Prof. Kinney offers an excellent, detailed exposition of the
Medicare program and its appeals processes as they relate to coverage issues, physician and
provider payment, beneficiary eligibility, etc. I highly recommend it to the reader interested
in a more in-depth examination of those issues. Since this particular article focuses on how
certain broad thematic concerns about access and efficiency relate to the specific proposal by
the Federal Courts Study Committee, my references to the substantive structure of Medicare
will be more limited.
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program.98
The addition of Titles XVIII and XIX (Medicare and Medicaid,
respectively) broadened the reach of the safety net more than any
single change since 1940, when Congress provided for monthly cash
payments to retirees. As the SSAct entered its second 25 years,
administrative operations under these two titles grew at an unprece-
dented rate. What began as the Bureau of Health Insurance within
HEW's SSA by 1977 had its own identity. Under President Jimmy
Carter, management of the Medicare and Medicaid programs trans-
ferred to the new Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA").99
Why did this growth spurt overshadow all previous expansions
of coverage under the SSAct? Unlike OASDI, which made cash
payments directly to beneficiaries, Medicare made cash payments
on behalf of beneficiaries to an ever-widening number of hospitals,
nursing homes, mental institutions, home health agencies, rehabili-
tation facilities, dialysis centers (all under Part A); plus physicians,
laboratories, x-ray facilities, technicians, therapists, outpatient clin-
ics, and medical equipment suppliers (under Part B).
Although Medicaid figured importantly, due to its smaller size
and its nature as a federal-state joint venture, it had substantially
less impact on the federal bureaucracy.
As some commentators had forewarned concerning the rapid
expansion of the Social Security program(s) in the 1930s and '40s,
expanding the number of interactions between government and citi-
zens ineluctably led to increasing numbers of controversies that re-
quire fair resolution. In 1965 it did not appear as if many legislators
had heeded the lessons from the past.
Rather than establishing a clear-cut appeals process from the
outset, the Congress simply carried over the limitations on judicial
review which applied to all proceedings under the SSAct. Thus,
Section 405(h) of the 1965 Amendments recodified and reapplied
the provisions of former Section 205(h) of the SSAct, limiting judi-
cial review to cases which had been heard according to the Secre-
tary's procedures. This jurisdictional limit applied to beneficiary
appeals regarding entitlement to benefits or amounts of benefits paid
98. Unlike their counterparts in the American Medical Association, the National Medi-
cal Association, comprised predominantly of African-American physicians, were early sup-
porters of Medicare and Medicaid, for they viewed such coverage as part of their larger civil
rights efforts. The NMA lent their support to Pres. Kennedy in his efforts during summer,
1963. See 55 J. NAT'L MED. ASS'N 464 (1963).
99. 42 Fed. Reg. 13,262 (1977).
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under Part A. If the amount in controversy was greater than $100
but less than $1000, beneficiaries could only obtain administrative
review. For amounts over $1000, beneficiaries could seek judicial
review. No express provision was made for administrative review of
provider disputes under Part A. Therefore, under 405(h), neither
could providers appeal to federal court.
Who heard the disputes of beneficiaries and providers? In the
name of efficiency, Congress had placed the first tier of review with
non-attorney, non-governmental "experts."
Ostensibly in order to benefit from the long experience of private
insurance companies in handling health insurance claims, the SSA
contracted with such companies to act as agents for the government
in processing Medicare claims. Under this system, HEW set gen-
eral guidelines about what Congress meant when it instructed the
Secretary to reimburse Medicare costs that were "reasonable and
necessary" - surely, two of the most elastic terms in law. Then
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, for example, implemented those guide-
lines, acting as the "intermediary" under Part A or the "carrier"
under Part B."o°
Adopting the trial examiner model of the Social Security referee,
the same intermediary which, acting as agent for the government,
had denied payment in the first place then adjudicated the benefici-
ary's and provider's administrative appeal of that denial. This first
step in the appeal process was optimistically called the "fair hear-
ing."o101 Provider appeals stopped here. Beneficiaries, on the other
hand, had further agency and court review available.
If the beneficiary did not succeed in convincing the intermediary
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 x(v)(1) (1988). As Mr. Cohen explained:
The principle of 'reasonable cost' for in-patient hospital services embodied in sec-
tion 1814(b) and 1861v(l) of the Social Security Act was never seriously debated or
opposed during the period 1961-65, as far as I can recollect. The provision in the
latter subsection that 'the Secretary shall consider, among other things, the princi-
ples generally applied by national organizations or established prepayment organi-
zations,' was accepted by Congress and the providers. No one criticized it during
the legislative process as a 'cost-plus' principle. No one thought of it as a basis for
inflationary price or cost rises. It was accepted not only because no other alterna-
tive was proposed, but because conventional wisdom at the time accepted reason-
able cost as a reasonable principle.
Cohen, supra note 96.
We should note that Mr. Cohen surely must be accepted as the authority on these points. He
had primary responsibility for "piloting the legislation through Congress and for its initial
implementation." He was Chairman of President Kennedy's Task Force on Health and So-
cial Security, and was the only person to have held the three posts of Assistant Secretary,
Under Secretary and Secretary of HEW.
101. Social Security Amendments of 1965, § 102 (a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395 u (c)(7) (1990)).
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of its error, then the beneficiary under Part A could appeal further
to a Social Security hearing officer (that decade's name for the refe-
ree, our decade's AIJ). If the hearing officer could not give satis-
faction, then the beneficiary could take her controversy to the
Appeals Council and thereby exhaust administrative review. If the
amount in controversy exceeded $1000, she could proceed to federal
district court for review of the agency record.
For Part B disputes, Congress only offered the carrier fair hear-
ing, whether the dispute was brought by a beneficiary or a provider.
With our 20/20 hindsight, Congress' failure to plan legislatively
to accommodate the ensuing pressure on the adjudicatory system
seems puzzling. Concerns about administrative justice throughout
the federal system had continued in the 1960s, and the tone had a
sharper edge than previously. During the period Congress was de-
bating passage of the 1965 Amendments, concerns about adminis-
trative inefficiency and politicization of the adjudicatory process
had become, to use Professor Walter Gellhorn's pithy phrase, a
"hardy perennial.""0 2 Yet, again as in prior decades, few seemed
ready to make a firm, consistent connection between the needs of
the overall system for administrative justice and the system as it
existed under the SSAct.
That is, until the 1970s. On the legislative front, we saw still
another vast expansion of the SSAct. Under President Richard M.
Nixon, Title XVI was added in 1972, providing Supplemental Se-
curity Income (SSI) to any qualifying disabled person, even those
under age 50 who had not been employed. Unlike OASDI, eligibil-
ity was based solely on need. Again, the addition of SSI did not
bring any special statutory accommodation to meet the increased
load of appeals which would surely follow. They simply were ad-
ded to the regular caseload of hearings by the Social Security AiLJs
and reviews by the Appeals Council. Later, Congress and HEW
converted several hundred non-AUJ hearing officers into ALJs to
handle the rapidly expanded caseload.103 The quantitative pressure
102. Walter Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial, 48 A.B.A. J.
243 (1962).
103. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Title XVI, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1465
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1991)). As Verkuil, et aL explain in their report, The Federal
Administrative Judiciary, the use of non-AIJs to decide disability cases was originally an
emergency, stop-gap measure enacted in 1958 by Congress to handle the increase in caseload
that followed the 1956 increase in disability coverage. It was extended for an additional term,
through 1960. The 1972 disability legislation permitted using non-ALJs to preside at SSI
hearings under Title XVI. Unfortunately, under statute, only APA-qualified ALJs could
hear Title II cases involved retirement, survivors, and traditional disability insurance. And,
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on the administrative system produced by this last broadening of
SSAct coverage was enough to move Congress within three years to
consider establishing a specialized Social Security Court.
Meantime, the 1972 Amendments also acted to establish the
first independent administrative tribunal within HEW to resolve dis-
putes, as first called for by President Roosevelt's administrative law
committees."°4 That tribunal was the Provider Reimbursement Re-
view Board. Finally, providers of services under Part A had an ad-
ministrative forum for resolution of disputes exceeding $10,000.
Further, they had a clear jurisdictional route to federal court re-
view. Just as importantly - perhaps most importantly? - the
PRRB was constituted to be insulated from the political pressures
which many believed had plagued adjudications under the Social
Security ALJ and Appeals Council mechanisms. 10 5
according to the 1975 Disability Claims Process Task Force, about 40% of the cases over-
lapped (Titles II and XVI). By 1976, Congress had adopted legislation to authorize explicitly
that non-AUJ hearing officers "could preside at all SSA adjudications" (Titles II, XVI, and
XVIII) on a temporary basis. That temporary basis became permanent in Pub. L. 92-216, 91
Stat. 1559 (1977). Supra note 18, at 19-22.
104. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
105. The implementing statute provided at 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (1990):
(a) Any provider of services which has filed a required cost report within the
time specified in regulations may obtain a hearing with respect to such cost report
by a Provider Reimbursement Review Board (hereinafter referred to as the
"Board")...
(I) such provider-
(A)(i) is dissatisfied with a final determination of the organization serving
as its fiscal intermediary ... as to the amount of total program reimburse-
ment due the provider for the items and services furnished to individuals
for which payment may be made... for the period covered by such report
(2) The amount in controversy is $10,000 or more, and
(3) such provider files a request for a hearing within 180 days after notice of
the intermediary's final determination ....
(c) At such hearing, the provider of services shall have the right to be repre-
sented by counsel, to introduce evidence, and to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses. Evidence may be received at any such hearing even though inadmissible
under rules of evidence applicable to court procedure.
(d) A decision by the Board shall be based upon the record made at such hear-
ing, which shall include the evidence considered by the intermediary and such other
evidence as may be obtained or received by the Board, and shall be supported by
substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. The Board shall have
the power to affirm, modify, or reverse a final determination of the fiscal intermedi-
ary with respect to a cost report and to make any other revisions on matters covered
by such cost report (including revisions adverse to the provider of services) even
though such matters were not considered by the intermediary in making such final
determination.
(e) The Board shall have full power and authority to make rules and establish
procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter or regulations of
the Secretary, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
section. In the course of any hearing the Board may administer oaths and affirma-
tions. The provisions of subsections (d) and (e) of section 405 of this title with
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The procedural changes increasing access and bringing appeals
under the SSAct in line with general developments in administrative
law did not spring from executive or legislative benevolence. They
derived, instead, from the push of providers, beneficiaries, and their
attorney representatives in the court system.
b. Litigation
The SSAct had long provided that upon termination of benefits,
one could obtain a fair hearing subject to APA provisions for for-
mal adjudications. However, it took a series of court cases in the
1970s and '80s to solidly fix the legal stature of benefits review.10 6
During that period, federal courts made searching examinations
of statutory and constitutional defects in the review processes that
existed pursuant to the SSAct and regulations implementing the
respect to subpenas shall apply to the Board to the same extent as they apply to the
Secretary with respect to [Title II of the SS Act]
(f)(1) A decision of the Board shall be final unless the Secretary, on his own
motion, and within 60 days after the provider of services is notified of the Board's
decision, reverses, affirms, or modifies the Board's decision. Providers shall have
the right to obtain judicial review of any final decision of the Board, or of any
reversal, affirmance, or modification by the Secretary, by a civil action commenced
within 60 days of the date on which notice of any final decision by the Board or of
any reversal, affirmance, or modification by the Secretary is received. Providers
shall also have the right to obtain judicial review of any action of the fiscal interme-
diary which involves a question of law or regulations relevant to the matters in
controversy whenever the Board determines (on its own motion or at the request of
a provider of services as described in the following sentence) that it is without au-
thority to decide the question, by a civil action commenced within sixty days of the
date on which notification of such determination is received.... Such action shall
be brought in the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which
the provider is located (or, in an action brought jointly by several providers, the
judicial district in which the greatest number of such providers are located) or in
the District Court for the District of Columbia and shall be tried pursuant to the
applicable provisions under chapter 7 of Title 5 notwithstanding any other provi-
sions in section 405 of this title....
(h) The Board shall be composed of five members appointed by the Secretary
without regard to the provisions of Title 5 governing appointments in the competi-
tive services. Two of such members shall be representative of providers of services.
All of the members of the Board shall be persons knowledgeable in the field of
payment of providers of services, and at least one of them shall be a certified public
accountant. Members of the Board shall be entitled to receive compensation at
rates fixed by Secretary, but not exceeding the rate specified (at the time the service
involved is rendered by such members) for grade GS-18 in section 5332 of Title 5.
The term of office shall be three years, except that the Secretary shall appoint the
initial members of the Board for shorter terms to the extent necessary to permit
staggered terms of office.
(i) The Board is authorized to engage such technical assistance as may be re-
quired to carry out its functions, and the Secretary shall, in addition, make available
to the Board such secretarial, clerical, and other assistance as the Board may re-
quire to carry out its functions.
106. Since this article alms to identify large thematic concerns that have shaped the
broadening or narrowing of administrative and judicial review for Medicare, this section will
merely highlight pertinent features of key SSAct litigation.
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Act's various titles. Echoing the concerns (and solutions) of the
1939 debate over federal administrative hearing procedures,"0 7 the
government scarcely contested whether benefits under the SSAct
were rights or privileges. Instead, by statute and regulations the
SSAct made available procedures for formal adjudication of dis-
putes. But were those procedures sufficient in terms of extent, tim-
ing and form? In a not-so-rhythmic, rarely graceful two-step,
advances in litigation to increase procedural access were followed
by legislative or regulatory revisions to institutionalize the courts'
decisions.
Perhaps, though, the most important and enduring by-product
of this "two-step" exceeded litigation or legislation alone. The dec-
ade-and-a-half of court action to improve procedural access awak-
ened all participants to the age-old need for a citizen "in distress"
over a governmental action to have a forum where he can "pour out
his heart." ' The cases that we typically look to as launching the
due process revolution raised awareness and expectations about be-
ing heard within the agency and, later, in court.
1) SSAct Title XIV - Welfare. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 launched the first salvo in that revolution. There, fourteen New
York City recipients of AFDC, the federally assisted welfare pro-
gram established in 1935 under Title XIV of the SSAct, sued state
and local officials over hearing procedures upon termination of ben-
efits. States had long been required to offer "fair hearings" in ac-
cordance with SSAct procedures. At issue was whether that fair
hearing - constitutionally - could be delayed until after benefits
had already been terminated.
At the dawn of the 1970s, having weathered the tumult of the
'60s, New York did not even contest the statutory and constitu-
tional right of AFDC recipients to have access to review. Perhaps
New York City's three-fold increase in numbers of welfare recipi-
ents had overwhelmed the traditional concept of welfare as a lim-
ited discretionary charity or privilege. Perhaps the in-court and
out-of-court efforts of welfare activists to reform the system had
weakened reliance on the privileges versus rights distinction as a
litigation strategy."° For whatever reasons, the state did not revive
the classic defenses against administrative and judicial review of dis-
107. See Davis, supra note 52.
108. From The Instruction of Ptahhotep, supra note 35.
109. For a general, contemporary description of the efforts of the National Welfare
Rights Organization see N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 1969, at 1.
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putes concerning government benefits. Thus, the Supreme Court's
validation of beneficiary rights to review resounded even more
convincingly.
As the Court laid out there,
'[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportu-
nity to be heard.' [citation omitted] The hearing must be 'at a
meaningful time and in a meaningfil manner.' [citation
omitted]x10
The constitutionally fatal defect in the Title XIV procedures was
that "a recipient [was] not permitted to present evidence" to the
official who finally determined eligibility. Nor was the recipient
permitted "to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses."
Over the next decade and more, the Supreme Court attempted
to explain what it meant by "an opportunity to be heard... at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." That effort, espe-
cially in terms of the SSAct and its various titles, focused primarily
on issues Justice Black raised in his dissent: How do we provide
access to meaningful administrative and judicial review when the
volume of cases is simply staggering?
He saw the pressure of a million-plus welfare recipients in New
York as arguing against benefits being characterized as an "entitle-
ment." He argued in favor of holding the constitutional line, keep-
ing such benefits mere gratuities, because operating "a welfare
state" on such a vast scale was "a new experiment for our
Nation." 111
In a perceptive caution about the paradoxical dynamics of
programmatic legislation, Justice Black warned his brethren that
the increased access to full administrative and judicial review which
Goldberg seemed to rest on the Constitution, ultimately, would not
benefit "the poor and needy." The Court may well have believed it
had widened access (through the front door); however, due to the
administrative burden imposed by increased numbers of claimants,
the agency might need to narrow availability (through the back
door).
[T]he end result of today's decision may well be that the govern-
ment, once it decides to give welfare benefits, cannot reverse that
decision until the recipient has had the benefits of full adminis-
trative and judicial review, including, of course, the opportunity
to present his case to this Court. Since this process will usually
entail a delay of several years, the inevitable result of such a con-
110. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
111. Id. at 279.
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stitutionally imposed burden will be that the government will not
put a claimant on the rolls initially until it has made an exhaus-
tive investigation to determine his eligibility. While this Court
will perhaps have insured that no needy person will be taken off
the rolls without a full 'due process' proceeding, it will also have
insured that many will never get on the roll, or at least that they
will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to
determine initial eligibility.
1 12
In this nearly prophetic passage, Justice Black outlined what be-
came and remains the central struggle in fashioning any large-scale,
nationwide system of bureaucratic justice. When (1) the benefits
program covers ever-increasing millions of persons annually; and
(2) increasing access to full administrative and judicial review, con-
sistent with our ancient belief in allowing persons with a grievance
against the government to be heard; offering individualized justice
ultimately will (3) so increase the direct and indirect administrative
costs of the benefits program that the agency must find mechanisms
to limit payments in the name of efficiency and cost-control.
2) SSAct Title II - Disability. Six years later when the
Supreme Court reviewed the sufficiency of hearing procedures for
disability benefits under Title II of the SSAct, the administrative
burden of processing millions of claims annually proved pivotal.
Mathews v. Eldridge challenged HEW's procedures for terminating
continuing disability benefits. The agency's determination that the
beneficiary no longer suffered from a legally cognizable disability
was based on a "paper" review of the beneficiary's case.113 Post-
termination, agency procedures offered a reconsideration hearing.
Was this constitutionally sufficient? Yes.
The Court laid out three now-classic factors to measure the pro-
cess that was due. Typically, analysis stressed the first factor - the
private interest affected - as that interest found expression in the
SSAct provisions under dispute. As compared to the private inter-
est at issue in Goldberg, "[e]ligibility for disability benefits... [was]
not based upon financial need."1 14 Therefore, the Court, according
to the statutory scheme, could not have assumed that Title II bene-
fits supplied Mr. Eldridge's sole source of income. The deprivation
of those benefits could not be seen as a situation of "brutal need" as
it had been in Goldberg.115
112. Id.
113. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 219, 323-24.
114. Id. at 325.
115. See id. at 340-42.
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On the other hand, we might just as productively have focused
on the third factor: the government's interest in limiting the "fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional... procedural re-
quirement would entail."' '16 Unlike the gloss afforded this issue six
years before, the majority now emphasized "conserving scarce fiscal
and administrative resources."
Surely the emphasis would have shifted. For in the span of six
brief years, the SSAct disability program(s) had ballooned. As
mentioned earlier, in 1972, Title XVI added a welfare disability pro-
gram. By 1974, approximately 2 million persons received benefits, a
more than ten-fold increase from the approximately 150,000 of
1957.
Given the sheer volume of claims requiring processing, any pro-
cedural change which increased access to administrative review
would increase the already considerable burdens on the system.
Echoing (but not adopting) Justice Black's dissent in Goldberg, the
Mathews majority now warned that the legal analysis of procedural
protections must also include something akin to a cost-benefit anal-
ysis. "Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the prelimi-
nary administrative process has identified as likely to be found
undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserv-
ing since resources available for any particular program of social
welfare are not unlimited .... ,117 Indeed.
As much as anything else, Mathews v. Eldridge marked a dawn-
ing awareness that even for the "worthy poor" the SSAct safety net
programs could not stretch infinitely. Costs attached to each in-
crease in access, whether larger access derived from expanding ben-
efits or from expanding procedural protections to challenge the
agency's terms for granting or denying benefits. Over the next ten
years, this concern grew to assume major importance in SSAct pro-
grams, and remains so today.
This concern, stated as above, presents perhaps a brutal truth.
It is a truth which, understandably, policymakers and politicians
usually avoid stating explicitly if possible."1 " Instead, from the lat-
116. Id. at 335.
117. Id. at 348.
118. It is easy to understand anyone's reluctance to enter this fray, especially as it relates
to health care payments. After one has stripped away the rhetoric, we are clearly talking
about rationing the resources which make life possible. This, therefore, raises not only polit-
ical and economic, but also profound ethical issues. See eg., James F. Blumstein, Rationing
Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal and Policy Analysis, 59 TEx. L. REv. 1345
(1981); Rand E. Rosenblatt, Rationing 'Normal' Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59
TEX. L. REv. 1401 (1981); HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL
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ter 1970s on, the language of the debate over access to administra-
tive and judicial review and efficiency in benefits review took on a
different tone, a somewhat different focus than it had in the 1930s,
'40s, '50s or even '60s. Adjudicative "efficiency" began to connote
more than merely a prompt, orderly review of claims for payment.
Rather, an "efficient" system for adjudications under the SSAct be-
gan to imply that the adjudicatory process resulted in a consistent,
predictable pattern of denials in line with the program administra-
tor's chosen methodologies for achieving budget targets.
Few, if any programs under the SSAct illustrated the subtle shift
in debate better than Medicare.
3) SSAct Title XVIII - Medicare. The enactment of the So-
cial Security Amendments of 1965 represented a milestone in the
development of the modem administrative state. Even more so
than with retirement, survivors', welfare or disability benefits, the
government now entered into millions of business transactions with
medical institutions and individual practitioners on behalf of tens of
millions of beneficiaries.
Considering the vast amounts of money at issue (even in the
woefully underestimated initial figures), and considering the sheer
volume of government-citizen transactions many of which inevita-
bly would result in dispute, Congress' failure expressly to establish a
formal system for administrative and judicial review of Medicare
claims seems paradoxical. On the other hand, hammering out an
agreement on substantive terms for the Medicare program proved
so difficult that one can understand Congress might not have had
much energy left for addressing "mere" procedural matters.
Yet, of course, those "mere' procedural matters quickly took on
constitutional proportions.
The very structure of the mechanism for paying and reviewing
Medicare claims virtually assured that institutional providers would
encounter what they perceived as injustice. As alluded to earlier,
the fundamental statutory principle guiding what costs would or
would not be reimbursed carried within it the seeds of litigation.
In SSAct Section 1861(v)(1) the government undertook to reim-
burse the "reasonable and necessary" costs of providing health care
services to Medicare beneficiaries. This did not mean that hospitals,
for example, merely filed a patient-by-patient claim for services ren-
PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984); PAUL T. MENZEL, STRONG MEDICINE
(1990).
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dered. Provider claims under Part A of Medicare quickly became
the "big ticket" items drawing on the Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund because their "reasonable and necessary" costs were com-
puted thusly: A hospital aggregated its total direct and indirect
(overhead) costs for rendering services to all patients throughout
the cost reporting period (usually the fiscal year). The hospital then
placed those costs into categories of allowable (e.g., employee ex-
penses, interest expense, depreciation, pensions) and non-allowable
costs (namely, services to non-Medicare patients or unnecessary
services), according to Medicare regulations. Then the government
paid a percentage of allowable costs based on the percentage of
Medicare utilization (a proportion of Medicare patient days com-
pared to total patient days). Needless to say, a statutory scheme for
compensation with such broad guides offered fertile ground for dis-
sention over what was under the law "reasonable and necessary."
The next key factor assuring a continuing sense of dissatisfac-
tion with the fairness of the process involved how this vague statu-
tory principle was executed. Unlike most government agencies, the
Social Security Administration, through its Bureau of Health Insur-
ance (BHI, the predecessor of the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration or HCFA), typically did not itself process provider claims
for compensation. Rather, Congress, bowing to the prior experi-
ence (and political power?) of the private insurance industry, con-
tracted with major insurance companies to act as agents for
Medicare. Thus, a private insurer operating under delegation by
the Secretary of HEW performed the initial review of the provider's
cost report, checking it for accuracy and making cost disallowances
on behalf of BiI.
Understandably, many a provider itself might have disputed -
in turn - the accuracy of the intermediary's disallowances. Yet
Title XVIII's original procedures did not afford providers an oppor-
tunity to resolve its dispute with the government principal, HEW.
The provider's only avenue for resolving disputes which typically
involved up to one-third of its operating expenses for any given
year, was to deal with the private agent which had denied payment
initially.
Intermediary procedures for hearing provider disputes varied.
Furthermore, such hearing procedures as existed were pursuant to
contract between HEW/BHI and the intermediary; not pursuant to
statute or regulation. The Blue Cross Association of America, Inc.,
(BCA) the national membership organization to which local, non-
profit Blue Cross plans belonged, offered aggrieved providers an ap-
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peal to the BCA Provider Appeals Committee at BCA's Chicago
headquarters. According to BCA procedures, the majority of Ap-
peals Committee members were BCA employees, including a BCA
vice-president.1 19 Until new regulations were adopted in 1974, for-
profit insurers acting as intermediaries generally did not provide the
hearing procedures which were part of their HEW/BHI contract.
Mutual of Omaha apparently referred some provider disputes to the
Social Security Administration for the type of "informal" and "ad-
visory" consultative form of resolution which had always typified
informal appeals of controversies with the federal government. 120
Beyond the composition of the hearing officers and format of the
hearing, providers also might have been drawn to challenge the very
propriety of some aspects of the intermediary contract. At least two
factors raised questions of possible conflicts of interest. First, local
Blue Cross plans were able to negotiate with state insurance depart-
ments arrangements whereby cost disallowances which the Plan
achieved under the Medicare program automatically were disallow-
ances (dollar-for-dollar) under their private Blue Cross policies,
119. As described by two leading health law attorneys, drawing on their own experience
and that of other attorneys throughout the nation, an intermediary hearing before BCA was
as follows:
Although the formal procedure did not permit preheating pleadings or discov-
ery, the BCA took informal action to acquaint the adversaries and the Appeals
Committee members with the positions taken by the Plan and the provider. The
BCA prepared a pamphlet containing the BCA's version of the dispute and the
applicable regulations or policy, a statement of the position of the Plan, and the
provider's statement of position. The Plan's statement was concise, argumentative,
carefully prepared, and well reasoned. In contrast, the providers 'statement' nor-
mally consisted of one or more letters written during the early stages of reimburse-
ment negotiation, without notice of their possible ultimate use, to describe the
hospital administrator's unrefined and uncounseled version of the claim. As a re-
sult, the pamphlet frequently did not fairly represent the provider's position. In
addition to circulating the pamphlet, BCA staff counsel sometimes briefed BCA
members of the Appeals Committee on the issues several days before the hearing.
Neither the provider, its attorneys, nor representatives of the national provider as-
sociations were invited to attend or were even advised of the briefings.
At the scheduled Appeals Committee hearing, first the provider and then the
Plan presented testimony and documentary evidence in support of their positions,
each side having the right to cross-examine witnesses. During the presentation of
evidence, BCA staff counsel advised the Appeals Committee on matters such as the
order of evidence and validity of objections. At the close of evidence, unless the
provider requested an opportunity to submit a brief after receiving the hearing tran-
script, BCA staff counsel retired with the Appeals Committee while they made their
decision. The BCA procedure required the Committee to render a written decision
within 30 days of the hearing; that decision was final. Although the Secretary re-
ceived an information copy of all committee decisions, a disappointed provider
could not secure review of the Appeal Committee's decision....
Leonard C. Homer & Peter Platten, Medicare Provider Reimbursement Disputes: An Analysis
of the Administrative Hearing Procedures, 63 GEo. L.J. 107, 112-13 (1974).
120. Id. at 116. See also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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also. 2 ' Second, much more widespread and perhaps more perni-
cious: More than a third of BCA's annual income was paid to it by
HEW for administrative services as Medicare intermediary (for
Part A) and carrier (for Part B). 122 BCA's contractual relationship
depended significantly on whether the BHI perceived it as being ap-
propriately vigilant in containing Medicare costs. Thus, overall, the
impartiality of the intermediary clearly was subject to question.
The first court squarely to address and resolve whether the pro-
cedures violated due process was the District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida in Coral Gables Convalescent Home v.
Richardson.23 The process of cost reporting and reimbursement
for nursing homes worked much as described for hospitals. There,
Aetna Life and Casualty Co. served as intermediary. Following the
mechanism outlined above, it audited Coral Gables' cost reports for
1967 and '69 and disallowed 50% of current Medicare payments to
the nursing home in order to recoup the alleged overpayments.
True to the form described above, Aetna (a for-profit insurer) held
informal conferences with the provider, but offered no administra-
tive hearing, no appeal to HEW, no appeal to the court. Without
hesitation, the Southern District of Florida applied Goldberg v.
Kelly, and found the provider's position to be unequivocally
stronger:
Plaintiffs grievance here arises not from a question involving
government-administered benefits, but from one involving com-
pensation for services rendered the government. On any balanc-
ing of interests analysis, the government's interest in protecting
the treasury by prompt recapture of excess payments and by
avoidance of evidentiary hearings are not overriding here. 124
Hence, the court ordered the Secretary of HEW to establish a
process for review of providers' claims before a decision-maker
"who must be impartial and must not have participated in the audit
determination under review... ."I25 The adjudicator must "state
his reasons for his decision and indicate the evidence on which he
relied." '26 Finally, the court ordered the adoption of new regula-
tions to effectuate the new hearing procedures "immediately."
Congress actually moved more rapidly than the executive
121. Homer & Platten, supra note 119, at 110, n. 26.
122. Id. at 132; Temple Univ. v. Associated Hosp. Servs., 361 F.Supp. 263, 266 (E.D. Pa.
1973).
123. 340 F.Supp. 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
124. Id. at 650.
125. Id. at 651.
126. Id.
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branch. In the Social Security Amendments of 1972,27 Congress
retraced its steps and formalized the hearing procedures which os-
tensibly should have existed in some form from the outset. It cre-
ated the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. Implementing
regulations followed in 1974.
Unlike the private insurance company employees who had
heard provider cases under delegated authority by the Secretary,
and unlike Social Security Administration ALJs and the Appeals
Council, the PRRB and its members were statutorily independent
of BHI and the Social Security Administration. Members served
full-time, three-year terms, appointed by the Secretary. In order to
make the positions attractive to experienced persons able to offer
expert adjudication of intricate regulatory issues (to use the lan-
guage of the Federal Courts Study Committee recommendation),
PRRB members were compensated on the so-called "super-grades",
Senior Executive Service, scale. A member could be reappointed
for one additional, consecutive term. A member could only be re-
moved for "good cause." ' 8
PRRB hearings were far more formalized than the intermediary
or SSA AUJ hearings. Rather than adopting the trial examiner
mode, PRRB hearings were full-scale, formal, trial-type adjudica-
tions almost indistinguishable from regular court proceedings; ex-
cept that federal rules of evidence and civil procedure did not
apply."2 9 The clearly adversarial nature of the PRRB hearing con-
127. Section 243 (a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(h) (1992).
129. As set forth in the statute at 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (1992):
(c) Right to counsel; rules of evidence. At such hearing, the provider of services shall
have the right to be represented by counsel, to introduce evidence, and to examine and cross-
examine witnesses. Evidence may be received at any such hearing even though inadmissible
under rules of evidence applicable to court procedure.
(d) Decisions of Board. A decision by the Board shall be based upon the record made at
such hearing, which shall include the evidence considered by the intermediary and such other
evidence as may be obtained or received by the Board, and shall be supported by substantial
evidence when the record is viewed as a whole. The Board shall have power to affirm, mod-
ify, or reverse a final determination of the fiscal intermediary with respect to a cost report and
to make any other revisions on matters covered by such cost report (including revisions ad-
verse to the provider of services) even though such matters were not considered by the inter-
mediary in making such final determination.
(e) Rules and regulations. The Board shall have full power and authority to make rules
and establish procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this subchapter or regula-
tions of the Secretary, which are necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
section. In the course of any hearing the Board may administer oaths and affirmations. The
provisions of subsections (d), (e), and (f) of section 405 of this title with respect to subpoenas
shall apply to the Board to the same extent as they apply to the Secretary with respect to
subchapter II of this chapter [Title II of the SSAct].
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trasted sharply with the emphasis on intermediary hearings being
non-adversarial, according to BHI Instructions Sec. 2626.130
Considering that, at least currently, we might wish to encourage
non-litigious resolution of disputes as much as feasible, was this a
beneficial development?
Two leading health law attorneys, Leonard C. Homer and Peter
Platten, responded to this concern as it related to intermediary
hearings in an early and still immensely valuable article. In their
analysis, they drew upon their own practice experience and surveys
of attorneys throughout the nation dealing in Medicare reimburse-
ment matters. They found that in an administrative system where
there already existed inadequate separation of quasi-prosecutorial
or investigative and quasi-judicial functions, increased formaliza-
tion was desirable. Emphasizing the non-adversarial, consultative
role of the intermediary hearing process tended "to perpetuate the
potential for unfair practices such as ex parte communication be-
tween hearing officers and intermediary staff or the resolution of
disputed issues on the basis of policies or instructions not raised at
the hearing." 131 Given the past history of Medicare intermediary
hearing practices, Homer and Platten only questioned how to in-
crease, not decrease, the formality of PRRB hearings.
IV. CHALLENGES OF THE PRESENT
As outlined earlier in this article, the primary dynamic operat-
ing throughout the first generation of the Social Security Act was
the push to expand access to substantive benefits. From lump sum
retirement and survivors' benefits, the SSAct evolved into monthly
cash payments to retirees and survivors. From coordinating reha-
bilitation services for the disabled it grew to provide monthly cash
payments to support disabled workers. The second generation ex-
panded access to a larger number of program participants than ever
before. Welfare benefits expanded beyond dependent children to in-
clude disabled persons who had not been part of the workforce.
The increase which was so sizeable that it reshaped the dimensions
of the SSAct and its administration was the addition of health care
benefits under Medicare and Medicaid.
Throughout the first and second generations of the SSAct, we
also saw an increase in procedural protections. The highly informal
agency procedures for resolving disputes between citizens and the
130. [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 26,733.
131. Homer & Platten, supra note 119, at 135.
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government which dominated in the pre-APA days gradually gave
way to greater formalization. Part of this formalization stemmed
from the Supreme Court's recognition that due process attached to
how and when the government heard and resolved disputes about
SSAct payments. The push to increase access in procedural matters
saw its apogee in dealing with the tens of billions of dollars involved
in Medicare Part A transactions with institutions, creating the Pro-
vider Reimbursement Review Board.
The third generation of the SSAct saw the beginning of a shift to
the opposite pole of the dynamic. Instead of broadening the SSAct
safety net, the counter push began to narrow coverage in order to
conserve the fiscal integrity of the Social Security Trust Funds.
Surely one could scarcely gainsay the authority - indeed, perhaps
the obligation? - of Congress to exert controls over payments from
the Trust Funds. Yet, our system contains some inherent, subtle
inhibitions on congressional action.
Legislative controls over payment policies are duly expressed
through statutory provisions. However, because legislative changes
must be effected in the public spotlight, Congress typically is much
more adroit at broadening access when in the public glare, than nar-
rowing access. Narrowing, usually, might occur through bureau-
cratic and managerial mechanisms within the agency; that is to say,
through the proverbial "back door."
Under Title II of the SSAct, this shift in dynamics took three
major forms at the agency level. The "grid" created an evidentiary
assembly line in an attempt to assure some measure of national uni-
formity in disability determinations. 132 The Social Security Admin-
istrator instituted a controversial program of ALJ case review
affecting upgrades and promotions for those whose decisions con-
formed (or failed to conform) to agency policies. 133 Finally, there
was the agency's position where all else failed: non-acquiescence,
although federal courts of appeals had ruled agency policies
invalid. 1
34
Were such actions per se unreasonable or inappropriate? Not
likely. Nevertheless, such practices and policies raised concerns
about whether the independent judgment of the Social Security ALJ
corps might have been compromised. 135 At a minimum, might
such policies have had a chilling effect on the decision-maker, such
132. Supra note 30.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Supra note 32.
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that the ALU's proper discretion in making determinations
favorable to the citizen was improperly constrained? If there was
such a chilling effect, then a Social Security Court which virtually
foreclosed federal court review would weaken even further the insti-
tutional assurances of justice.
Let us now turn to explore whether the process for administra-
tive review by the PRRB has been susceptible to similar concerns
about "back door" limitations on access to the Medicare program.
Two key areas deserve attention: (1) PRRB jurisdiction under the
Prospective Payment System (PPS) and (2) HCFA's provision of
administrative support to the PRRB.
A. Non-Acquiescence on Procedure
A sharply defined struggle between access and efficiency began
forming when Medicare payment methodologies shifted from retro-
spective payment of reasonable and necessary costs to prospective
payment of the average costs for providing care to Medicare pa-
tients. By 1972, Congress had awakened to the need to exert some
sort of controls on Medicare costs, and so instituted cost limits that
created standards for "reasonableness" under SSAct Sec.
1861v(l)(A). When those limits proved ineffective in controlling in-
flation in Medicare's share of health costs, Congress enacted "target
rate" limits on reasonable costs. Finally, in 1983, Congress began
to transition Medicare inpatient payments to a prospective system
where reasonableness played a diminished role. Instead, when the
system was fully in place, providers would receive a flat payment to
cover average resources consumed in providing services to the aver-
age Medicare patient.1 36
Those average costs were based on national averages for treating
467 categories of medical conditions, known as diagnosis-related
groups ("DRGs"). Under the new system, once fully in place, hos-
pitals received a DRG payment per patient irrespective of the hos-
pital's actual costs incurred; irrespective of the complexity of the
patient's condition due to underlying secondary or tertiary illnesses;
irrespective of actual length of stay. Hospitals did receive some ini-
tial recognition of actual costs, through Medicare's payment of hos-
pital-specific costs based on each hospital's own costs in its base
year.
DRGs were phased in, so the hospital-specific portion of the
PPS payment represented an increasingly smaller portion of the
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1992).
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payment. DRGs constituted an increasingly larger portion, until by
1990 Medicare's inpatient PPS payments were fully based on
DRGs. Even after full implementation of DRGs, however, the PPS
payment was not truly all-inclusive. It excluded, among other
things, allowable hospital costs for the base year, capital payments,
and medical education costs. (Further, it did not include Part B
payments, largely to physicians.)
Clearly, undeniably, PPS' objective was to contain Medicare
costs and thereby protect the fiscal soundness of the Hospital Insur-
ance Trust Fund. But did Congress also intend to foreclose admin-
istrative and judicial review of disputes under PPS?
The first PRRB case squarely to confront the issue was Augus-
tana Hospital & Health Care Center v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Ass'n.137 Augustana Hospital, like so many other Medicare provid-
ers, had sought payment from HCFA for Medicare providers, had
sought payment from HCFA for medicare's share of the cost of
medical malpractice insurance, a staple overhead cost for any hospi-
tal. For a number of years HCFA had balked at paying its pro-rata
share of such costs, arguing that since Medicare patients are not as
litigious as other patients, Medicare should not have to pay a pro-
portional share of malpractice insurance costs, but a lesser share.
The battle raged before the PRRB and the federal courts for years,
with providers consistently winning. HCFA reluctantly acquiesced
in 1986, and did so retroactively.
However, the base year for determining the hospital-based por-
tion of Augustana's payments under PPS pre-dated HCFA's official
change in policy. Thus, when the intermediary calculated Augus-
tana's allowable costs for the hospital-specific portion of the PPS
payment during the phase-in period, it did not include the malprac-
tice insurance costs which were later permitted retroactively.
Naturally, Augustana sought a revision of the hospital-specific
portion to include the omitted costs. The intermediary refused,
citing a regulation adopted by the Secretary, 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.474(b)(3)(i) (1984) that the intermediary's estimates and
modifications of base year costs "are final," with only a limited set
of exceptions, none of which applied explicitly to Augustana's posi-
tion. The next subparagraph (ii) offered that prospective relief
might be available if, and only if, "the intermediary's estimation
137. PRRB Hearing Dec. No. 88-DIl, Dec. 30, 1987 (Revised Jan 11, 1988), [1988-1
Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 36,779.
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was unreasonable and clearly erroneous in light of the data available
at the time of estimation."
The PRRB majority accepted the intermediary's argument that
a change in the law (HCFA's change in policy, now acquiescing to
the federal court decisions) was not a change in data. Moreover,
the majority accepted the intermediary's argument that the regula-
tion § 405.474(b) cut off administrative and judicial review of most,
if not virtually all, changes to the complicated construct of PPS
payments; that barring such review was an essential part of install-
ing a reliable, consistent system of flat payments designed to contain
costs.
The minority (Board Member Phyllis E. Bernard, joined by
Chairman Paul Morton Ganeles) reasoned:
To the extent there are limits on which PPS payment issues can
be reviewed, those limits are specifically set out in 42 U.S.C.
1395ww(d)(7). This provision excludes from administrative or
judicial review those adjustments to the average standardized
DRG payment which are made to maintain budget neutrality.
Also excluded from review are questions concerning the very es-
tablishment of DRGs, the methodology for classifying discharges
within DRGs, and the appropriate weighing factors employed to
reflect use of hospital resources and changes in treatment pat-
terns, technology, etc. These highly technical and policy-driven
matters are, instead, to be resolved wholly by the Secretary in
consultation with the Congressional Office of Technology Assess-
ment and the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission....
Conversely, Congress made express provision for other non-
technical, non-DRG aspects of PPS payments to be subject to
administrative and judicial review under 42 U.S.C. Section
1395oo. In addition to the plain language of the statute, the leg-
islative history unequivocally supports the availability of PRRB
review. Both the House and Senate reports accompanying the
PPS legislation expressly state that the Medicare statute 'would
provide for the same procedures for administrative and judicial
review of payments under the prospective payment system as is
[sic] currently provided for cost-based payments.'
H.R. Rep. No. 98-25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 143, reprinted in 1983
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 362; S. Rep. No. 98-23, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 57, reprinted in 1983 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 197.138
Despite what to a minority of the Board appeared to be a clear-
cut congressional mandate for review, the Secretary had issued a
confusing series of "interim final", then "final", then "technical cor-
rections" regulations which had up-ended the procedures for ad-
138. Id. at 15,909.
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ministrative review of Medicare disputes. In adopting 42 C.F.R.
§ 405.474(b)(3)(ii) (1984), the Secretary established a scope and
standard of review for determinations before the PRRB unlike any
standard previously applied to Medicare adjudications. According
to the Secretary's regulation, the intermediary's estimation of the
hospital's costs for determining the hospital-specific portion of the
PPS rate could be reviewed "only with respect to whether the inter-
mediary followed the provisions" of the regulation concerning, pri-
marily, calculations and corrections to recognize certain categories
of successful appeals. In this limited review, the adjudicator could
only examine "whether the intermediary used the best data avail-
able at the time." As the regulation made explicit: "Specifically
excluded from administrative or judicial review are any issues based
on data, information, or arguments not presented to the intermedi-
ary at the time of the estimate." It is noteworthy that usually the
estimate was performed ex parte, as a ministerial function by the
intermediary, some one-and-a-half years before the provider had
any notice of the estimation.
After thus limiting the scope of inquiry, the Secretary proceeded
to erect a new standard for administrative and judicial review. Es-
chewing APA standards, the Secretary pronounced that "an inter-
mediary's estimation will be revised.., only if the estimation was
unreasonable and clearly erroneous in light of the data available at
the time the estimation was made." This regulatory standard
sharply contrasted with the statutory standard for Medicare pay-
ment matters. As the Augustana minority pointed out:
[W]hether administrative review is meaningful or not depends
upon the scope of evidence considered and the standard of review
applied to that evidence. Hence, 42 U.S.C. 1395oo(d) provides
that:
'A decision by the Board shall be based upon the record
made at such hearing, which shall include the evidence con-
sidered by the intermediary and such other evidence as may
be obtained or received by the Board, and shall be supported
by substantial evidence when the record is reviewed as a
whole.'
Indeed, the scope of review for the Board is expressly made large.
Congress empowered the Board to 'affirm, modify, or reverse a
final determination of the fiscal intermediary with respect to a
cost report and to make any other revisions on matters covered
by such cost report . . . even though such matters were not
considered by the intermediary in making such final
determination.' 39
139. Id. at 15,910.
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As the A ugustana minority concluded, applying the Secretary's reg-
ulations would weaken the statute and render administrative or ju-
dicial review essentially meaningless.
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had
supported this type of analysis in Georgetown University Hospital v.
Bowen (Georgetown I1),14 it came as little surprise that the Admin-
istrator of HCFA, exercising his authority to review PRRB deci-
sions, chose to affirm the Augustana majority. With regard to
Georgetown II, the Administrator stated he was "cognizant of that
decision, but note[d] that an appeal [was] being considered. There-
fore, the Administrator respectfully decline[d] to acquiesce." While
the Administrator's rationalizations about Congress allowing the
Secretary to fill statutory gaps sounded strained, at best,14' the Ad-
ministrator's more straightforward explanation based on conserving
funds sounded with far more conviction:
[I]n the interest of preserving the integrity of the essentially pro-
spective nature of the new payment system, the Administrator
has interpreted the Act as permitting retroactive rate adjust-
ments in only very limited circumstances .... In this regard, the
Administrator recognizes that the efficacy of the prospective sys-
tem, mandated by Congress to compel hospitals to be cost con-
scious, depends upon rates being fixed in advance with certainty.
The Inspector General and the Comptroller General both recom-
mended that the referenced estimates should be prospectively cor-
rected to eliminate excess profits.142
Notwithstanding the refreshing candor of the Administrator's
closing paragraphs, the agency chose within a year to acquiesce.
Yielding not to fiscal interests represented by the Inspector General
and Comptroller General, but yielding instead to the recent
140. 862 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
141. As explained by the Administrator and by the PRRB majority:
The statutory scheme set up by Congress is consistent with the objective of estab-
lishing final, prospective rates. Sec. 1886(d) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1395ww) describes how the PPS rates are to be determined for the period of transi-
tion from the cost-based reimbursement system to the prospective payment system.
A key element for such determination is the amount of allowable operating costs of
inpatient hospital services recognized by the Medicare program for the base period.
When the amount of such costs is later changed as the result of subsequent events,
the statute is silent on when such change should be incorporated into the PPS rate.
By failing to so specify, Congress has delegated to the Secretary the responsibility
for filling this gap by regulation. The regulations implementing PPS permit appeals
of base-year adjustments. However, they limit the application of the result of such
an appeal to rates for PPS years beginning after the appeal, except in those limited
circumstances where the Intermediary failed to use the best data available to deter-
mine the hospital-specific rate.
HCFA Administrator Decision, [1988-2 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE
(CCH) 37,022, at 16,407.
142. Id. at 16,408.
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Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit decisions increasing access to
PRRB review, the Secretary issued HCFAR 89-1, an interpretive
ruling which acknowledged Georgetown II controlled. 143
Attorneys accustomed to the Social Security Administration's
long-standing policy of non-acquiescence, resisting for many years
federal court constructions of disability law, would likely be taken
somewhat off-guard by the relative speed with which the Health
Care Financing Administration issued HCFAR 89-1. However,
HCFA had just lost the first two Supreme Court cases testing
PRRB jurisdiction.14 HCFA's Office of the General Counsel had
reached a consensus that the government's position in Georgetown
II was sufficiently weak that appeal would not be advisable.145
Thus, the Medicare appeals issues could be distinguished from the
disability appeals, where HHS had adopted a policy of non-acquies-
cence because the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the issue.
Here, HHS did understand what positions the Supreme Court had
or likely would have taken on the contested issues. Therefore, rea-
sonably swift acquiescence was highly appropriate.
This sounds favorable. Yet, we are exploring here whether we
can create a review mechanism that does not necessarily have to
rely on timely, favorable Supreme Court oversight in order for the
system to function with fairness and according to law. Especially if
143. HCFA Ruling No. 89-1, [HCFA Ruling No. 89-1 [1989-1 Transfer Binder] MEDI-
CARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 37,614, at 19,185 (Jan. 26, 1989).
144. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 485 U.S. 399, 404-05 (1988), accepting the princi-
ple that providers should be permitted to reopen cost reports to claim costs which they had
"self-disallowed" in accordance with program instructions, but which they believed they had
a claim. This principle was first proposed in Athens Community Hosp. v. Schweiker, 514
F.Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981), and had been rejected before the D.C. Circuit in Athens II, 686
F.2d 989-95 (D.D. Cir. 1982). The very next term the Supreme Court decided Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204-5 (1988), which held that Medicare's wage limits on
hospital costs could not be published retroactively.
145. As the ruling explains, "[Tmwo recent decisions issued respectively by the United
States Supreme Court in Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988) ("Ge-
orgetown I") and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Georgetown Univ. Hosp. v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Georgetown II"), con-
trol and thereby render moot for lack of an actual case or controversy various claims and
appeals challenging certain Medicare reimbursement regulations that are now pending before
fiscal intermediaries, the Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB), HCFA and in the
federal courts." HCFA Ruling No. 89-1, supra note 143, at 19,815.
Further, there is always the possibility that dedicated individuals may have helped moder-
ate HCFA's non-acquiescence policies regarding PPS and other reimbursement matters (viz.
accounting for labor-delivery room days and malpractice payments). Many observers credit
the shift in HCFA's stance, among other things, to the influence of Henry R. Goldberg, an
extremely experienced senior HCFA attorney who had been promoted to Deputy Chief
Counsel for Litigation.
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the nation eventually adopts the Federal Courts Study Committee
model of a specialized Article I court for Medicare or for all Social
Security appeals, then we must have in place a reliable system of
administrative justice which scarcely requires the heavy reins of Ar-
ticle III courts in order to guide the adjudicators and the Secretary
to comply with Congress' instructions. More fundamentally, we are
seeking to design a system of administrative justice which fulfills the
deep-rooted principles of our civilization, that a citizen should have
a fair and impartial hearing of grievances against his government.
With that in mind, then, the pivotal question becomes whether
the structure of the PRRB did, in fact, insulate members from any
real or perceived negative reaction from the Secretary due to mem-
bers' exercise of their independent judgment? Were decisions by
PRRB members vulnerable to the chilling effect about which Social
Security ALJs were so apprehensive, and which many outside ob-
servers believed had already crippled the impartiality of the Appeals
Council?
It would seem as if the Augustana decision presented a singular
opportunity to bring such concerns to the fore, since the policy is-
sues and dollar amounts at stake were so large. As the Administra-
tor explained in his decision, the Comptroller General estimated
that in fiscal year 1986 alone, inaccurate PPS estimates would result
in Medicare overpayments of "about $940 million" and for the
transition period of FY 1986-90, the possibly appealable money at
issue amounted to "$8 billion." 1"
Notwithstanding the above, both dissenters, I and Mort
Ganeles, when asked, have unequivocally stated that no pressure -
subtle or overt - was ever exerted concerning Augustana. Perhaps
none was needed, since the majority of the Board agreed with the
Secretary's interpretation. But this "hands off' policy applied on
other occasions, on other issues where the PRRB consistently and
unanimously decided in favor of providers - although the Secre-
tary declined to acquiesce - on significant substantive issues such
as malpractice costs and accounting for labor/delivery room days.
Perhaps the institutional independence of the tribunal led to the
sense of decisional independence experienced by Board Members -
just as President Roosevelt's Committee on Administrative Prac-
tices had envisioned.
146. HCFA Administrator Decision, supra note 141, at 16,408.
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B. Bureaucratic Limitations on PRRB Independence
The independence of the PRRB has been a jealously guarded,
signal feature of its role in Medicare's system of administrative jus-
tice. In the eyes of many, the Board's independent operation and
support have long hinged upon the vigor with which HCFA carries
out its statutory obligation to make available technical and staff
support. 147
The issue first rose to a head in 1983 when PRRB members met
with the Health Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee to discuss a number of issues concerning Medicare appeals.
As Board Members Bette Kraus (Chairman), Mort Ganeles and
Richard Dudgeon explained in a letter summarizing their meeting
at PRRB offices: "[c]learly, resources (personnel, equipment and
material) is [sic] the most critical problem." The Members tried to
impress upon the Subcommittee that "[f]rom its inception, the
Board has operated as an orphan within HCFA, with a history of
unresponsiveness and inadequate support." The Members con-
cluded that mere admonishments to HCFA would not meet the
task. Instead, Congress needed to revise the institutional structure,
such that the PRRB had its own staff and budget. "The history of
the Board supports our conclusion that the only way the Board will
be able to fulfill its purpose is to be an agency independent of the
Department of Health and Human Services as well as the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA).... Clearly, the Board
must be independent in fact." '148
From 1983 through 1987 the load of cases filed grew exponen-
tially, while output fell off sharply beginning in 1987. During that
time period the Board engaged in a vigorous struggle with HCFA
to increase staff and to computerize operations in order to eliminate
a case backlog that had doubled.149 Computerization did not occur
until late 1987, and staff not only did not increase, but decreased
through attrition. In time, concern over support of PRRB opera-
tions became so acute that the Committee on Appropriations issued
a report expressing "concern over the potential appearance of a con-
ffict of interest in HCFA's unwillingness to allow the Board ade-
quate staff." 11°  The General Accounting Office (GAO) was
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(i) (1992).
148. Letter to S. Casbin and K. Yow (July 25, 1983) from Board Members Bette Kraus
(Chairman), Mort Ganeles, Richard Dudgeon.
149. See Memorandum to Dr. Regina McPhillips (Bureau of Data Management) from
Chairman, PRRB (May 15, 1986) and attached schedules of performance statistics.
150. GAO Report No. GAD/HRD-90-23 BR, Slowness ofAppeals Process for Medicare
1993]
HEALTH MATRIX
directed to investigate whether HCFA's relationship with the
PRRB impaired the Board's effectiveness in processing cases.
The GAO finally concluded that "several events occurring
around the same time may have contributed" to the decrease in case
output. The years of high case output tended to correspond to
years when the PRRB's position on malpractice costs and la-
bor/delivery room days - large group appeals involving dozens of
providers - resulted in numbers of "boilerplate" decisions. When
HCFA finally acquiesced on these issues, the appeals settled, and
PRRB case output declined somewhat.
A point not covered by the GAO, but widely recognized by
providers and the Board, was that intermediaries throughout the
nation had virtually stopped issuing notices of program reimburse-
ment (NPRs) to hospitals. The NPR could be critical to a Medi-
care appeal.151 Generally, this notice constituted the threshold step
for pursuing a PPS appeal, according to the Secretary's interpreta-
tion pre-HCFAR 89-1. Following publication of HCFAR 89-1 in
January of 1989, intermediaries resumed issuing NPRs to hospitals
and PRRB appeals under PPS doubled the PRRB's caseload within
a year. 1
52
Case processing suffered because of lack of staff to manage cases
in the early steps.153 The GAO used HCFA's own management
study as a benchmark for measuring productivity. According to
HCFA's standards, the appropriate size of a technician's workload
is about 220 cases. At the PRRB, though, its three legal techni-
cians, who handled clerical functions, were each responsible for
about 800 cases. Understandably, their cases "were in the initial
steps of the appellate process significantly longer than the allowed
time.",154
Most of the PRRB staff are paralegal specialists known as Board
Part A Reimbursements, [1990 Transfer Binder] MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH)
38,492 at 22,786 (Feb. 9, 1990).
151. This was a controversial point in the early days of PPS. Consistent with the reason-
ing explained in my later dissent in Augustana, I had instituted a policy of issuing written
dissents on decisions where the majority denied jurisdiction for a PPS case based on lack of
an NPR.
152. The PRRB's workload statistics track cases according to the federal fiscal year,
which is October 1 through September 30. For fiscal year 1864 appeals were filed; fiscal year
87,855 were filed. In fiscal year 88,1519 were filed, increasing to 2240 in fiscal year 89 and
reaching a high of 3061 in fiscal year 91. The average amount in controversy in each PPRB
case has risen from an average of $250,000 in the period FY 86-89 to $300,000. PRRB
WORKLOAD STATISTICS (Jan. 17, 1992).
153. GAO Report, supra note 150, at 22,792.
154. Id. at 22,798.
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Advisors. They are classified at the GS-14 level, which is a grade
below the classification for most Social Security ALJs. Advisors are
responsible for processing cases, reviewing case documentation (po-
sition papers from both parties), drafting the Chairman's opening
statement and the list of documents submitted by both parties prior
to the hearing. The Board Advisor functions as bailiff/clerk during
the Board hearing. The full panel of Board Members hears each
case, sitting en banc, although statutory authorization does exist for
the Board to hear cases in split panels so that two cases could be
heard simultaneously. 155
The Advisor plays a sensitive role at the Board decision confer-
ence following the hearing and following submittal of post-hearing
briefs and supplemental evidence. At the decision conference, also
held en banc, the Advisor presents the facts, contentions and
HCFA rulings pertinent to the case. This is supposed to be done in
as wholly unbiased a manner as possible, presenting with equal em-
phasis both the provider and the intermediary's contentions, mak-
ing no personal recommendation one way or the other. The Board
then discusses the case, reaches a decision and directs the Advisor
to draft the decision. The draft decision is distributed among Board
Members for editing and revision until the Board as a whole is satis-
fied that the opinion expresses the will of the tribunal.
The GAO report did not describe the Board Advisor function in
the detail provided here. Perhaps that is because few people other
than PRRB Members themselves fully appreciate how sensitive and
potentially influential the Board Advisor's position can be in the
process of administrative review. Especially as the volume of cases
increases, and the pressure for output increases, PRRB Members,
like any tribunal, will tend to rely more heavily on the work done
by staff. Members would not abdicate their responsibility to exer-
cise the expertise and judgement for which they were appointed.
However, as workload demands increase, Members may ineluctably
be called upon to rely more and more upon the Advisors' summa-
ries and drafts in order to increase productivity. 156
155. In Spring, 1992 the PRRB began hearing cases in two panels (three-member and
two-member) where parties agreed to waive the three-member quorum.
156. A recent revision to PRRB procedures may help to moderate the influence of the
Advisor in the role of opinion-drafting. Under the "Provider Reimbursement Review Board
Process" statement of procedures revised as of 1991, post-hearing briefs submitted by the
provider and intermediary "should include a proposed formal decision. The Board will use
the winning sides proposed decision as a basis for its final written decision." As explained
further in a footnote to that statement, "The proposed decision should contain a statement of
the issue(s), a summary of facts, citation of applicable law and regulations, findings and con-
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Thus, it appears to me, from the triple perspective of a former
litigator before the PRRB, then Member, and now neutral aca-
demic, that actually the Board Advisor position requires almost as
much institutional independence from HCFA as the Board Mem-
bers themselves enjoy. This does not mean that the Board Advisor
position need be raised on the GS scale. (At GS-14, the position
cannot be raised much higher.) This does, however, mean that the
institutional lines of support and civil service/personnel control
need to be maintained as clearly separate from HCFA as possible.
Otherwise, the Board could quietly relapse into the early days of
Medicare adjudications before intermediaries, where ex parte con-
tacts flourished and few, if any, lines separated quasi-prosecutorial
from quasi-judicial functions.
GAO concluded that HCFA held no animus toward the PRRB,
nor "intent of impairing PRRB's effectiveness." GAO saw
"HCFA's apparent unwillingness to provide the Board with staff'
as related simply to "the allocation of scarce resources among com-
peting demands." ' 7 I would raise the concern that even without
evidence of bad intent by HCFA, the very existence of such control
over the vital fiscal and human resources necessary to operate the
PRRB can compromise its effectiveness as a forum for administra-
tive justice. 158
V. PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE
In just another three years several anniversaries will roughly co-
incide: the 30th anniversary of the Medicare Act, the 50th anniver-
sary of the Administrative Procedure Act, and the 60th anniversary
of the Social Security Act. According to some prognosticators,
those anniversaries might also coincide with our first truly serious
recent congressional debate seeking to implement national health
care reform. By "serious" I mean debate which is likely to result
not merely in further studies, but in adopted, comprehensive
legislation.
Hopefully, those debates will evidence the detailed and
clusions (contentions of the parties where appropriate should be referenced in this section not
in the summary of facts), and the decision."
157. GAO Report, supra note 150, at 22, 798.
158. It may be very worthwhile to monitor closely the progress of the Medicare Geo-
graphical Classification Board, created by Congress on the model of the PRRB to resolve
disputes concerning rural/urban classification under PPS. Originally, the PRRB was provid-
ing staff support to the MGCB. Now, HCFA has assumed direct staff support for the
MGCB. Its attempt to do so with the PRRB was unsuccessful.
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foresightful discussion of financing and procedure which thus far
has been lacking. In particular, the mechanism for resolving a large
volume of high-dollar payment disputes has typically been left as a
"black box," to be filled in later, according to internal and external
agency pressures. As we have seen, over time, the back-and-forth of
those internal and external pressures leads to a grudging compro-
mise on: who shall have access? on what terms? with "efficiency"
defined as a speedy decision? or "efficiency" defined as a predict-
able, budget-neutral decision? Again, as we have seen, such an ad-
ministrative process - one which is "TBA" ("to be announced")
- can result in a fundamental sense that bureaucratic justice under
the Social Security Act is by definition impossible. It is a contradic-
tion in terms. And if justice cannot be had within the bureaucracy,
then the call will increase for justice in the already overburdened
courts.
In a curious reprise, we in the mid-1990s may have an opportu-
nity to remake the administrative and judicial review procedures for
financing of health care services with more knowledge than our
predecessors had available to them. Sixty years ago the process was
barely stumbling along as President Roosevelt's men and women
cobbled together the Social Security Act. Few people at that time
recognized the overwhelming dimensions of the program they were
then instituting. Now, clearly, we recognize the leviathan at the
table. We understand that whatever changes are made to Social
Security Act procedures will have a far-reaching impact on tens of
millions of Americans.
However, especially with the addition of the Medicare program
in the 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act, we have now
come to recognize that the cost of maintaining this leviathan is one
of the biggest challenges facing the national budget today. We fur-
ther know that if Medicare is expanded to provide universal cover-
age, the strain between access and efficiency will increase
logarithmically.
Thus, a more sophisticated debate over health care reform in the
mid-90s may place us squarely again at the intersection between the
APA and the SSAct. That level of debate will raise again the issue
of foreclosing full Article III judicial review, as it has been raised
periodically since the 1930s; as it was raised most recently in the
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee.
Would such foreclosure be legally (and politically) viable for an
expanded Medicare program or other federally sponsored health in-
surance? At its heart, the answer depends upon how one perceives
19931
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the essential integrity of the bureaucratic structure; not necessarily
the bureaucrats themselves, but the framework within which they
operate. There appear to be two major foci: (1) those who perceive
Medicare administration as a fluid process, with intermediaries and
providers in an on-going working relationship, well-suited for infor-
mal methods of dispute resolution; and (2) those who never lose
sight of HCFA's role as the real party in interest, and thus remain
wary that budget concerns might override due process. This second
focus, then, sees an ever-present need for formalized review
processes.
If our nation does indeed expand the Social Security Act such
that Medicare offers "universal coverage", would the PRRB (or a
successor tribunal modeled on the PRRB) offer the institutional in-
dependence necessary to assure fair and lawful resolution of dis-
putes against HCFA? I believe the answer is a qualified "yes". The
qualification: The administrative tribunal must be statutorily in-
dependent from HCFA (and perhaps even HHS). It must also en-
joy functional independence extending beyond the adjudicators to
encompass also the staff, plus operational matters concerning
budget and equipment.
It seems clear, however, that even an expanded PRRB (or suc-
cessor PRRB) could not efficiently handle the increased caseload
which would follow universal coverage. Therefore, I believe we
need to explore in greater depth further modifications to Medicare's
system for administrative and judicial review, as outlined below.
A. Administrative and Judicial Review in Countries with
Established National Health Insurance Programs
The Federal Courts Study Committee, in recommending that
we establish a legislative court to review disability claims, alluded to
the fact that such administrative courts are a common feature of
European legal systems. Americans have long held a fascination
with the British, and now the Canadian, experience in providing
national health insurance. However, we have not examined in de-
tail the legal procedures for review of disputes between participants
in the insurance program and the government agency administering
the program. Canada, Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland
(whose constitution is modeled on that of the U.S.), France and
Germany all have systems of national health insurance that have
experienced cost pressures similar to our own. 59
159. See e.g., George J. Schieber, Health Expenditures in Major Industrialized Countries,
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These countries also typically rely on administrative courts to
handle specialized subject matters, a practice which is not so typical
in the United States. More fundamentally, their systems of law,
their political, social and philosophical traditions and expectations,
do not necessarily bear as close a similarity to ours as they might
seem upon a superficial appraisal. Of key importance is the basic
fact that most European systems of justice derive from a
code/inquisitor model instead of a common law/adversary
model. 1" Such considerations may bear particular weight in deter-
1960-87, 11 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 159 (Summer 1990); Markus Schneider, Health Care
Cost Containment in the Federal Republic of Germany, 12 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 87
(Spring 1991); also HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIP-
TION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE (1984).
160. See, eg., ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW
(1989); HENRY W. R. WADE, TOWARDS ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE (1963).
Also Julius H. Grey, The Ideology of Administrative Law, 13 MANITOBA L.J 35 (1983)
(examining Canadian administrative law, including its British and French foundations); W.
A. Bogart, Courts and Tribunals Conflict and Co-Existence, 8 CiV. JUST. Q. 7 (1989) (exam-
ining the relationship between courts and administrative tribunals in Canada); David P.
Jones, The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 14 ALBERTA L. REv. I
(1976); P. A. Cote, Droit civil et drait administratifau Quebec, 17 C. DED. 825 (1976) (exam-
ining the proper limits of civil and administrative law in Quebec province); Louis Bernier, La
Cour d'appel et le controle judiciaire de la legalite des acte de l'administration, 8 REv.
JURIDIQUE THEMIS 421 (1973) (examining the Canadian equivalent of Article III court re-
view of and control over administrative agency actions); D. Mullan, Judicial Restraints on
Administrative Action: Effective or Illusory?, 17 C. DED. 913 (1976) (challenging the proposi-
tion that judicial review of agency actions is not guaranteed under the Canadian constitu-
tion).
Concerning French tribunaux: L. Neville Brown & John Bell, Recent Reforms of French
Administrative Justice, 8 CIV. JuST. Q. 71 (1989) (describing the case overload in the French
system of administrative tribunals from which appeal can only be taken to a specialized
court); Christian Atias, Culture juridique americaine et ordre savant traditionel, 20 REv.
JURIDIQUE THEMIS 147 (1986) (examining the differences between French and American
legal cultures); L. Neville Brown, La nouvellejustice naturelle" l'administrateur 'equitable et
raisonnable; 21 C. DED. 67 (1980) (giving a French perspective on recent developments in
British administrative law concerning fairness and reasonableness in agency action); Hans G.
Crossland, Rights of the Individual to Challenge Administrative Action Before Administrative
Courts in France and Germany, 24 ITrr'L & COMP. L. Q. 707 (1975); and more broadly,
pointing to new trends in European administrative law, Alan Boyle, Administrative Justice,
Judicial Review and the Right to a Fair Hearing Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, PuB. L. 89 (1984).
Not surprisingly, the legal scholarship which may be most readily applicable comes from
Great Britain, where a social security system and a system of national health insurance have
been in place for many years. See, eg., A. W. Bradley, Recent Reform of Social Security
Adjudication in Great Britain, 26 C. DED. 403 (1985); L. Neville Brown, The British Social
Security Tribunals: A New Unified System for Adjudication of Social Security Benefits, 17
CAMBRIAN L. REV. 40 (1986) (Professor Brown is also a member of the British Council on
Tribunals); James G. Logie & Paul Q. Watchman, Social Security Appeal Tribunals: An Ex-
cursus on Evidential Issues, 8 CiV. JUST. Q. 109 (1989); Julian Webb, Social Security Adjudi-
cation, Judicial Review and the Technology of Poverty, 53 MOD. L. REv. 116 (1990). More
generally, Eric Barendt, Grievances, Remedies and the State, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 125
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mining whether - for American citizens - decisions that directly
or indirectly ration health care resources can be committed to the
unreviewed discretion of a government agency. If the system we
establish does not meet with American expectations about adminis-
trative justice, irrespective of the vaunted "efficiency" of such a pro-
cedure, that system will be perceived as lacking legitimacy.
Therefore, I recommend for and intend to pursue further re-
search a close comparative study of: (1) the financing systems for
national health insurance in the countries listed above; (2) the legal
procedures for review and resolution of disputes at the agency level
and beyond; and (3) how these countries have addressed the prob-
lem of access and efficiency as described in this article.
An in-depth study of these systems - not only their theory, but
also their practice - constitutes a fairly long-term project. It is,
however, one which I believe will be well worthwhile. We are the
last major Western government not to have a national health insur-
ance program. And yet even the provision of universal access in
other countries has not insulated them from significant, oftentimes
overwhelming problems of cost control. And when individual ac-
cess confronts mass pressure to limit costs, justice is caught betwixt
and between. It would serve us well to understand and learn care-
fully from the mistakes of our predecessors.
B. Developing a New Model for HHS Adjudication
In the nearer term, the next stage in my research on this general
topic will explore in much greater detail the theoretical and opera-
tional components of an adjudicatory model or models for the next
generation of Medicare appeals. Hopefully, the model(s) will be
able to serve, if need be, to accommodate not only HHS' current
Medicare appeal needs, but also the appellate needs for whatever
system of federally sponsored health insurance may finally be
adopted.
1. A Blended Model, Seeking Accommodation
At this early stage of analysis, it would appear that the first step
(1987); D. G. T. Williams, The Council on Tribunals. The First Twenty-Five Years, PUB. L.
73 (1984); D. G. T. Williams, The Tribunal System - Its Future Control and Supervision, 9
Civ. JusT. Q. 27 (1990) (Professor Williams was a member of the Council on Tribunals); A.
I. Ogus, Bureaucrats as Institutional Heroes, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 309 (1987); Michael
Sayers & Adrian Webb, Franks Revisited: A Model of the Ideal Tribunal, 9 CIV. JUST. Q. 36
(1990); J. W. Bridge, Be You Never So High, The Law is Above You: Recent Developments in
English Public Law with Some American Comparisons, 8 ANGLo-AM. L. REV. 331 (1979).
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in developing a model which assures both the adjudicatory discre-
tion to render individual justice and the speed to handle large
volumes of cases might blend aspects of both the PRRB and the
SSA model into one. Thus, after the initial determination and re-
consideration, the provider would bring an appeal to an AL] for a
full, formal adjudication or an on-paper hearing, at the parties' dis-
cretion. A party which was dissatisfied with the ALJ's determina-
tion would be able to appeal to the PRRB. A critical set of issues
demand careful study here.
Specifically, if such a blending were carried out, what govern-
ment entity would have direct or indirect control over the ALJ?
The statutory independence of the Board Members themselves has
already been assured. However, the independence of SSA's ALJ's
has long been a matter of controversy. They are, obviously, em-
ployees of the agency, as are the members of the Social Security
Appeals Council.
It would seem that blending the two models for adjudication
would force the issue of AL independence to the forefront. In-
deed, the perceived reliability, fairness - the inherent justice - of
the entire system would stand or fall on whether the ALJ had the
opportunity to exercise the type of independent discretion which
any citizen has a right to expect from a person acting in a quasi-
judicial capacity. It would seem then that we would have to return
to incorporate a portion of the Federal Courts Study Committee's
recommendation concerning the Social Security Disability Pro-
gram. Namely, that if a Social Security Court is to be established,
the AILs rendering the decisions reviewed by that court must have
statutory independence from the agency.
I would add that, based upon the long history of HEW/HHS
and the political pressures to which costly programs can be subject,
it would be important to assure such ALJs also enjoy bureaucratic
independence from the agency. Otherwise, it is all too easy for the
Medicare (or health insurance) AJ corps to be "squeezed" as the
PRRB staff and operations have been.
Many further questions, of course, require a closer look in devel-
oping a blended model such as this. For example, could the current
SSA ALJs satisfy the need to review institutional claims by provid-
ers under the program? My personal and professional sense of the
matter, having dealt with both models of HHS adjudication, is that
there may be some inveterate difficulty in asking SSA ALJs to serve
in both capacities. The nature of the claims, the complexities (espe-
cially the financial and evidentiary complexities), the processes, the
1993]
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standards, the stakes are so different under the two programs. I
seriously question whether adjudicators accustomed to handling
cases under one program can effectively and fairly switch to adjudi-
cating cases under the other program. This would seem to be a
particular difficulty if the ALJs were required to handle mixed
caseloads. Perhaps it is best to allow a cadre of ALJs who have
been trained in that area and have developed the relevant expertise,
to continue as specialists in that program.
Clearly, a number of knots remain in this puzzle. In the next
stage of my research I intend to examine in detail the operational
pros and cons of various models blending different aspects of the
PRRB and SSA model. That analysis will include soliciting re-
sponses from various provider, intermediary and governmental en-
tities which have had an historical interest in HHS adjudications for
institutional health payments. The proposals will include more
than variations on reaching an accommodation between the two
current models. They will also include wholly new components:
a comprehensive system for mediation of claims which would
otherwise come before the PRRB; and the establishment of an
ombudsman system.
2. Establishment of a System for Mediation
During the latter 1980s, informal settlement of PRRB cases
before hearing became a leading method of case resolution. New
PRRB hearing procedures which require parties to exchange posi-
tion papers (briefs) before filing with the Board, have apparently
accelerated the settlement rate.161
If the Medicare program is to expand exponentially, then ad hoc
informal settlement surely is insufficient to address the caseload
problem. Although the average size of a PRRB case is quite large
(from 1986 through 1991, the average case size ranged from
$250,000 to $300,000), the issues involved often can lend themselves
161. As set forth in the "Provider Reimbursement Review Board Process" notice of pro-
cedures revised 1991, after the PRRB has determined whether it has jurisdiction, the pro-
vider and intermediary:
Conduct, discovery, if necessary. Provider then prepares a draft position paper,
including evidence and exhibits and submits the position paper (brief) to the inter-
mediary (position paper is due to the intermediary 90 days prior to the due date for
submittal to the Board). The intermediary then prepares its own position paper
(within 60 days) and sends it to the provider. Both parties then have 30 days to
send copies of those papers and evidence and exhibits to each other and to the
PRRB. These are the final position papers covering the issues presented in the joint
agreement statement. Supplemental position papers will not be accepted on these
issues.
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to mediation so long as the parties have representation which is rel-
atively equal in skill. Designing such a system requires sensitivity
to issues of due process, separation of functions, and protection
against ex parte communications with HCFA in order to avoid the
problems which had blighted the appeals process before establish-
ment of the PRRB.
Thus, we must ask whether this even is an appropriate function
for the PRRB (or its successor) to perform? If so, who would be
appropriate to act as mediator? A Member? An Advisor? Another
as-yet-undefined employee? Is this an appropriate function for
HCFA? To what extent, if any, would HCFA's involvement be
appropriate?
I recommend further study of how to design such a mediation
system.16 This could be a valuable endeavor, helpful not only for
future PRRB needs, but even for resolving current backlogs. One
must use caution and, again, sensitivity, in evaluating the competing
pressures on a mediation system. The deeply entrenched traditions
of SSAct review (relying on the trial examiner mode), coupled with
Medicare's checkered history on procedural protections would lead
a reasonable observer to tread lightly when one suggests diminish-
ing the PRRB's formal adversarial process. Formal adjudications
surely do not dispose of cases as promptly as informal methods, but
the protections of the APA have withstood the test of time.
3. Establishing an Ombudsman System
Lastly, in addition to examining ways of improving the system
for resolving disputes after the transaction between government and
citizen has gone awry, I recommend studying further how we can
help prevent such controversies from arising in the first place. As
the Administrative Conference of the United States has recently
recommended in other contexts, 163 an ombudsman could perform
an important role in explaining payment policies, the availability of
162. This recommendation merely endorses that of the Administrative Conference of the
United States, as applied to federal agencies generally. See Recommendation 86-3: Agencies'
Use ofAlternative Means of Dispute Resolution, ACUS RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 9
(1986); background report, Phillip J. Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution
Procedures and the Administrative Proce= Acus RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 165
(1986) (giving background information on Recommendation 86-3).
163. See Recommendation 90-2, The Ombudsman in Federal Agencies, ACUS RECOM-
MENDATIONS AND REPORTS 8 (1990) (suggesting the effective role that ombudsman have
played in the Internal Revenue Service and that Army Material Command can be achieved in
all agencies); and background report, David R. Anderson & Diane M. Stockton, Ombudsmen
in Federal Agencies The Theory and the Practice, id. at 105.
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services, etc. Such guidance could be valuable to both the benefici-
ary and provider. If given in advance of the rendition of services, it
could greatly assist in clarifying the confusing array of technical
limitations on payment.
As a legal matter, though, this seemingly simple, straightfor-
ward proposal may raise a number of thorny issues. Who is the
ombudsman? An employee? A volunteer? Would the ombudsman
be an agent for HCFA? To what extent would HCFA be bound by
representations made by the ombudsman concerning payment poli-
cies? Could payment for services be made contingent upon prior
approval by the ombudsman? Of course, we can look to the experi-
ence of ombudsmen in Areawide Agencies for the Aging as a start-
ing point,1 and then extrapolate to see whether and how that
model addresses the questions raised here. Again, this is a recom-
mendation which I believe has potentially strong benefits for the
next generation PRRB, and perhaps also for the current Medicare
program.
164. HHS supports state long-term care ombudsmen under the Federal Older American
Act of 1978 to "investigate complaints, settle disputes, monitor related legislation, regulation
and policy, and provide public information and train program volunteers." Anderson &
Stockton, id. at 200-01.
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